Chapter 28
The Best Possible Approach
Optimal Grace, Middle Knowledge, and the Encounter God Knew Would Work
Full-Length Edition
Frank is seventy-eight years old, and his heart is giving out.
He lies in a hospital bed with the monitors beeping their tired rhythm. His daughter Sarah sits beside him. She has been there for hours. She has been praying for her father for thirty years.
Frank is not a cruel man. But he is hard. He held grudges the way some men hold property. When his wife was dying and asked whether he had ever once prayed, he told her the truth: no, and he was not about to start. He has lived seventy-eight years without God, and he plans to die the same way.
Sarah watches the monitors. She watches his chest rise and fall. And the question she cannot stop asking is the one this whole chapter tries to answer: Was there ever really a chance for him? Did God do everything God could do?
This chapter says yes. And it says yes by bringing three streams together into one river.
The first stream is the work of the philosopher Jerry Walls, who gave us the idea of optimal grace: the claim that a perfectly loving God would offer each person the best possible appeal, tailored to that particular heart. The second stream is this book's moment-of-death thesis: the claim that every dying person meets the risen Christ at the threshold between life and death. The third stream is a system called Molinism, developed by Timothy Stratton on the foundation laid by the sixteenth-century Spanish priest Luis de Molina and the philosopher William Lane Craig. Molinism answers the question of how God knows which appeal would work for which soul.
Walls supplies the motive: what a loving God would do. The moment-of-death encounter supplies the mechanism: where and how the appeal lands. Stratton's Molinism supplies the architecture: how God knows what the best appeal is. Take away any one of the three, and the picture is incomplete. Together, they tell a single story. The encounter is not God's backup plan. It is, for many people, the single best approach God knew would work.
We will not dodge the hard parts. There is a sad possibility built into this model, and we will look at it honestly. But first, the good news. And the good news is very, very good.
A word about how this chapter is built. We begin with Walls's optimal grace: what a loving God would do. Then we locate the offer at the threshold of death: where it lands. Then we introduce Molinism: how God knows what the best appeal is. After that, we test the idea against Scripture, walk through a worked example at Frank's bedside, face the hard edge honestly, lay the strongest opposing argument on the table, and close with the pastoral heart of the matter. The structure follows the logic. One stream leads to the next.
What a Loving God Would Do: Jerry Walls and Optimal Grace
Start with what we know about God. The Bible says God desires all people to be saved (1 Tim 2:4). It says God is not willing that any should perish (2 Pet 3:9). It says God is love (1 John 4:8). These are not footnotes in the story of God. They are the headline.
If God truly loves every person, then God would not offer the gospel the way a company offers a coupon. He would not broadcast a generic message and shrug at whoever missed it. A God who knows each heart, who knows each wound and each wall, would present the gospel to each person in the way most likely to win a free "yes."
The philosopher Jerry Walls gave this idea its name. In his 1992 book Hell: The Logic of Damnation, Walls proposed that for each person there is a certain measure of grace that represents the best God can do for that soul without destroying that soul's freedom. He called it optimal grace.1 Walls's own definition is worth hearing in full: this measure of grace is "the optimal amount of influence toward good which God can exercise on that person's will without destroying his freedom."2 And God distributes this grace to everyone: "grace of optimal measure is given to all persons."3
Primary Source — Jerry Walls on Optimal Grace
Walls writes that optimal grace "will differ in some respects from one individual person to another. What represents measure N for Jones may completely overwhelm Smith in such a way that his freedom is destroyed. Moreover, what is effective in influencing Smith toward good may only make Jones more resistant. So the even distribution of grace does not in any way entail treating all persons in just the same way. It means doing what is best for each individual to elicit, if possible, a positive response from him."4
Twenty years later, Walls restated the idea in Purgatory: The Logic of Total Transformation. There he made the personal nature of optimal grace even more vivid. "God knows how best to elicit a positive response from each person, without destroying or overriding their freedom," he wrote. "What would be highly effective in converting one person might make another more resistant."5 Optimal grace is not a cookie-cutter distribution. It is not merely sufficient grace. It is the best God can do for each soul. And Walls was clear about its result: "damnation only results from the persistent choice to reject optimal grace."6
Think of it this way. A pamphlet left on a doorstep is sufficient grace. A closest friend sitting down with you, knowing your fears, your wounds, and your deepest longings, speaking truth in exactly the words you need to hear, at exactly the moment you are most ready to hear them: that is optimal grace.
Notice what Walls is saying. A decisive response to God is not a snap judgment. It is not a last-second panic under pressure. It is "a settled response which is made by one fully informed of the Christian faith." The response must be "a rooted disposition." It "normally would not be achieved in a moment, but rather only through a longer series of choices." Initial choices might be against God. In the long run, a person might still come to love God in a settled way. What is decisive is "the settled disposition one ultimately acquires."67
This is crucial for the encounter at the moment of death. The encounter, subjectively extended by time-dilation, gives the soul time for a real, settled response. It is not a pop quiz. It is an invitation with room to breathe, to see, to choose.
Walls also stresses that optimal grace does not require the removal of all difficulty. A certain element of trial may be necessary. What matters is that the soul has everything it needs to respond freely. The grace "compensates for the unfair disadvantages which some have had." It levels the field without leveling the soul.68
Two protections need to be stated right away. First, optimal grace is not coercion. God woos; He never forces. A manufactured "yes" is a puppet's nod, and a puppet's nod means nothing. Second, optimal grace does not guarantee that everyone says yes. Walls is explicit: some may still refuse. But the refusal is not for lack of love on God's part. It is despite the fullest love God can give.
One more thing. If the manner of the appeal is tailored, so is its sequence. What comes first, what comes second, what the soul sees before it sees Christ's face: all of this is part of what makes the approach optimal. We will return to this in Section 5, where the full picture comes into focus.
Before we move on, a clarification. Some readers will wonder whether optimal grace is just another name for "irresistible grace" in the Reformed tradition. It is not. Irresistible grace, in the Calvinist system, is grace that always succeeds. The elect cannot finally resist it. Optimal grace is grace that can be refused. It is the best God can do, but the best God can do still leaves the soul free to say no. This is not a weakness in the concept. It is its strength. A love that cannot be refused is not love. It is compulsion. Walls's genius is to describe a grace that is as powerful as it can possibly be without crossing the line into force.70
And if God truly loves each person this way, the next question is immediate: where does the offer happen? When does the dying person meet this love? This brings us to the second stream.
Where This Book Locates the Offer: The Threshold, Not the Afterlife
Most proposals about postmortem salvation put the offer somewhere in the intermediate state, in Hades, or at the final judgment. This book proposes something different. The offer is peri-mortem, not strictly post-mortem. The word "peri-mortem" means "around death." The word "post-mortem" means "after death." The difference matters enormously.7
On this book's view, the encounter happens at the threshold between life and death. The dying person is still a living agent. This dissolves a worry that haunts many postmortem proposals: do the dead have the kind of living freedom a real, life-defining choice requires? At the threshold, that question does not arise. The choice is the last living act of a living person.8
Walls himself anticipated this placement. In the very chapter of Hell that coins optimal grace, he works through a thought experiment about two women who die young. What does a loving God do for a woman who never had a real chance to respond to the gospel? Walls's answer is striking: God "could give her the grace at the moment of death to begin to become what she would have become if she had not died."9 Grace withheld in this life, Walls writes, "could be given at the time of death" and extended "beyond this life."10 That sentence was written in 1992, twenty years before this book existed. The moment-of-death thesis is not a departure from Walls. It is the completion of a move Walls himself began.
Key Argument — Why the Threshold?
Walls supplies the why: a loving God would offer optimal grace. The moment-of-death encounter supplies the where and how: the offer lands at the threshold between life and death, where the dying person is still a living agent, still free, still responsible. The peri-mortem placement dissolves the dead-agent problem that haunts many postmortem proposals and completes the move Walls himself began in 1992. The dying person meets the risen Christ in a subjectively extended encounter (Chapters 16–19), with time to respond fully and freely.
The fit between Walls and this book is not forced. It is natural. Walls recognized that some people never get a fair chance in this life. A child who dies in infancy. A person born into deep deprivation. A woman killed before she could explore the faith. Walls's own logic demanded a solution. And the solution he reached for, almost in passing, was exactly the one this book develops at length: grace given at the threshold of death itself.
Fit the two streams together. Walls supplies the why: a loving God would offer optimal grace. The moment-of-death encounter supplies the where and how: the offer lands at the threshold between life and death, in a subjectively extended corridor where the soul has time to respond. The two streams need each other. Without Walls, the encounter is unexplained love. Without the encounter, Walls's optimal grace has no clear landing point. Together, they tell a coherent story.
But a question remains. If God tailors the approach to each person, how does God know what the best approach is? How does God know that overwhelming tenderness would reach one soul, while the quiet voice of a long-dead spouse would reach another? How does God know that blazing glory would break one heart open and harden another?
This is where the third stream enters the river.
How God Knows: A Spaniard, Three Kinds of Knowledge, and "What Would Happen"
In the sixteenth century, a Spanish Jesuit priest named Luis de Molina (1535–1600) tackled one of the oldest puzzles in theology. How can God be fully sovereign over everything that happens while human beings remain genuinely free? If God controls every detail, are we just puppets? If we are truly free, has God lost control?11
Molina was a Jesuit. He lived in Spain during the great age of Catholic theology. And the question he faced was not merely academic. The Reformation had put the sovereignty of God at the center of the debate. Luther and Calvin argued that God determines everything, including who is saved and who is lost. The Catholic side wanted to protect human freedom without surrendering God's control. Molina found a way to do both.69
Molina's answer hinged on a special kind of divine knowledge. He proposed that God's knowledge comes in three logical moments. The philosopher William Lane Craig later gave these their standard names, and the theologian Timothy Stratton summarized them clearly in Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism.12
Understanding why Molina's proposal matters requires grasping the knot he was trying to untie. If God determines everything, then human beings are not genuinely free. If human beings are genuinely free, then God seems to lack control. Molina refused to accept the dilemma. He argued that God can be fully sovereign and humans can be genuinely free, if God knows what free creatures would freely do in every possible situation. That knowledge, logically prior to God's decision to create, gives God the ability to choose a world in which free choices serve His purposes.
The first moment is natural knowledge. This is God's knowledge of everything that could happen. Every possible world, every possible scenario, every possible combination of events and persons. This knowledge is necessary. God could not lack it.
The second moment is middle knowledge. This is the distinctive Molinist idea. Middle knowledge is God's knowledge of what every free creature would freely do in any given circumstance. Not what they must do. Not what they are forced to do. What they would freely choose. If Sarah were placed in this circumstance, she would freely choose this. If Frank were placed in that circumstance, he would freely choose that.
The third moment is free knowledge. This is God's knowledge of what will actually happen in the world God chose to create. Armed with middle knowledge, God selected this particular world out of all feasible options and brought it into being.13
The order is logical, not chronological. God never learns. He never turns a page and discovers something He did not already know. The three moments describe the structure of God's knowledge, not a process of discovery.14
The Three Moments, in Plain Words
Natural knowledge: God knows everything that could happen. Middle knowledge: God knows what every free person would freely do in any circumstance. Free knowledge: God knows what will happen, because He chose to create a world in which those free choices play out. Think of it this way. A chess grandmaster knows every legal move (natural knowledge). A grandmaster who also knows exactly how a particular opponent would respond to every possible opening (middle knowledge) can choose the game that achieves the best outcome (free knowledge). God is infinitely greater than any grandmaster, but the structure is the same.
A key emphasis: middle knowledge does not determine what people choose. It knows what they would choose. The difference is everything. Determination destroys freedom. Knowledge respects it. A parent who knows that her child will choose chocolate over vanilla is not forcing the child to choose chocolate. She simply knows her child.
The payoff is this: middle knowledge lets God achieve His purposes through free choices rather than over them. God does not override anyone's freedom. He arranges the world so that free choices fit within His plan. Craig puts the point simply: God's sovereignty is exercised through free human decisions, not against them.15
"Mere Molinism" and Real Freedom
Stratton has given the basic Molinist framework a helpful label: "mere Molinism." The word "mere" does the same job C. S. Lewis's title Mere Christianity did. It identifies the core that different theological traditions share.16 Mere Molinism rests on two pillars: (1) God possesses middle knowledge, and (2) human beings possess libertarian freedom.17
Libertarian freedom needs a plain definition. It has nothing to do with the political party. Libertarian freedom means that a person's choice is neither random nor determined. You could really have chosen otherwise. Your decision was not the inevitable output of prior causes like a ball rolling downhill. It was a genuine choice, made by you, from real options.18
Stratton defends libertarian freedom with what he calls "the free-thinking argument." The argument runs like this. If every belief you hold is merely the inevitable result of prior physical causes, then your beliefs are not the product of rational evaluation. They are just dominoes falling. But if that is true, then you cannot trust your own reasoning. You cannot trust even the belief that determinism is true. Rationality itself collapses. Trusting your own mind requires that your thinking is genuinely free.19
The force of this argument is felt most sharply in the present conversation. If determinism is true, then Frank's rejection of God for seventy-eight years was not really Frank's fault. He was just dominoes falling. And if God forces Frank to say yes at the deathbed, that "yes" is not really Frank's achievement. It is just more dominoes. The whole drama of salvation collapses into a puppet show. But if libertarian freedom is real, then Frank's "no" was genuinely his, and Frank's "yes," if it comes, will be genuinely his too. That is the only kind of "yes" worth having.
Apply this directly to Frank. If Frank's "yes" to God were determined, if it were just the inevitable result of prior causes, it would not be faith at all. It would be a reflex. God can make the appeal overwhelmingly clear without making the response unfree. Clarity is not coercion.
Stratton closes his argument with a stunning parallel. God has already shown us what it looks like for Him to limit Himself out of love. The Incarnation itself is the precedent. In Stratton's words: "The omnipresent became localized; the eternal stepped into time; the infinite clothed himself with finitude . . . not because of any deficiency, but out of love."20
Primary Source — Stratton on the Incarnation Precedent
Stratton writes: "God can choose to create humans in his image—beings who possess the ability to freely choose among a range of alternative options, each of which is consistent with their nature at the moment of choice. And since God is omniscient, he knows exactly how these free creatures would freely choose in every possible circumstance." Just as the Son of God chose to be limited by a body and a place in time, God can choose to be "limited" by the freedom of His creatures, "because doing so permits the very goods he values most: love, responsibility, relationship, and worship freely given."21
The God who stepped into time and a body to meet us is the God who meets each dying person in the corridor. He limits Himself, in both cases, for love.
Is Any of This in the Bible? The Keilah Window
Middle knowledge is a philosophical concept. But does it have any footing in Scripture?
The clearest biblical window is found in 1 Samuel 23:11–13. David is hiding in the city of Keilah, and he asks God two questions. "Will Saul come down to Keilah?" God answers: yes. "Will the men of Keilah hand me over to Saul?" God answers: yes, they will.22
So David leaves. And because David leaves, neither event ever happens. Saul does not come to Keilah. The men of Keilah do not hand David over. God answered questions about what free people would do in circumstances that never came to pass.
As the scholar Kirk MacGregor has pointed out, God's answers "did not constitute predictions of the future."23 They were answers about what free agents would freely choose in a situation that was never actualized. That is precisely what middle knowledge is: certain divine knowledge of free choices in circumstances that never actually occur. A fortune-teller offers a hunch. Only a God who possesses middle knowledge speaks such statements without error.24
Other biblical texts point in the same direction. In Exodus 32, Moses intercedes with God, and God's response shifts based on what Moses freely does.25 In Jeremiah 38:17–18, the prophet tells King Zedekiah two different futures: "If you surrender, the city will not be burned. If you do not surrender, it will." Both futures depend on Zedekiah's free choice.26
Then there is Matthew 11:21–24, where Jesus says that Tyre and Sidon would have repented if they had seen the miracles done in Chorazin and Bethsaida. MacGregor and Stratton read this as a genuine expression of middle knowledge: Jesus knew what these cities would have done in different circumstances.27 Craig has offered a different reading, suggesting the statement is hyperbole. But even on Craig's reading, the words assume that God knows what people would do in circumstances that never occurred.28
The Jesus saying about Tyre and Sidon is one of the most haunting verses in the Gospels. "Woe to you, Chorazin! Woe to you, Bethsaida! For if the mighty works done in you had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented long ago in sackcloth and ashes" (Matt 11:21). Jesus speaks as though He knows what people in other cities would have done under different conditions. Whether one reads this as literal middle knowledge (MacGregor, Stratton) or as hyperbole (Craig), the words assume a divine knowledge that reaches into the hypothetical, into the "what if."
A difficult question rises from this text. If Tyre and Sidon would have repented, why did God not give them the chance? Stratton answers with an important distinction found in his notes on this passage. A burst of repentance is not the same as persevering faith. The response God seeks is not a panicked flinch but "a freely chosen, persevering love relationship with God" (cf. 1 Cor 13:8). Think of the stony-ground seed in Matthew 13:20–21: it springs up quickly but has no root. It withers under pressure.29
The implication for the encounter is honest in both directions. The encounter at the moment of death is not about wringing a last-second flinch from a frightened person. It is the soul's real, settled orientation brought fully into the open and freely ratified or refused. This is one more reason the time-dilation discussed in Chapter 10 matters so much: the encounter is subjectively long enough for a real and persevering yes, or a real and final no.
Think about what this means for the encounter at the moment of death. The encounter is not about speed. It is not a game show buzzer that demands an instant answer. The time-dilation reported in near-death experiences (Chapter 10) gives the dying person subjective time. Enough time for a real process. Enough time for a settled response. The encounter is long enough for a persevering "yes" and long enough for a genuine, settled "no." No one is rushed into heaven or hell.
Bring Keilah back to Frank's bedside. God knows every possible way He could meet Frank. He knows which approaches Frank would freely refuse. He knows which approach, if any, Frank would freely embrace. He knows this the way He knew what the men of Keilah would do. And He acts on that knowledge.
Primary Source — The Keilah Account (1 Samuel 23:11–13)
"David said, ‘O Lord, the God of Israel, your servant has heard that Saul seeks to come to Keilah, to destroy the city on my account. Will the men of Keilah surrender me into his hand? Will Saul come down, as your servant has heard?’ The Lord said, ‘He will come down.’ Then David said, ‘Will the men of Keilah surrender me and my men into the hand of Saul?’ And the Lord said, ‘They will surrender you.’ Then David and his men . . . departed from Keilah . . . When Saul was told that David had escaped from Keilah, he did not go there." Neither event ever occurred. God answered questions about what free people would do in circumstances that never came to pass.
A Worked Example: The Three Moments at One Deathbed
Stratton illustrates the three moments of divine knowledge with a vivid example from Scripture: Peter's denial of Jesus in the courtyard. Jesus told Peter he would deny Him three times before the rooster crowed. Jesus knew what Peter would freely do in that particular situation. Peter was not forced. He was free. And Jesus knew exactly how Peter's freedom would play out.30
Now let us walk Frank through the three moments. And let us write Frank's encounter as a staged one, because that is what optimal grace, informed by middle knowledge, would produce for a man like Frank.
Natural knowledge. God knows every possible way Christ could meet Frank in the corridor of his dying. Blazing glory. Quiet words. The face of his late wife. The life review. Patient silence. An opening stretch of felt absence. Each approach is genuinely open either way: Frank could say yes or no to any of them.
Middle knowledge. God knows which approaches Frank would freely refuse. Blazing glory ignites the old defiance. Gentle words bounce off walls seventy-eight years thick. A commanding voice triggers every rebellious nerve in Frank's body. But God also knows which sequence, if any, Frank would freely embrace.
Free knowledge. God actualizes the approach He knows would reach Frank. And for Frank, it is a sequence.
The corridor opens not with light but with silence and felt absence. For the first time in his life the room is truly empty. Frank has spent seventy-eight years insisting that nobody is there. Now, in the corridor, he gets to feel what "nobody is there" actually means. And a man like Frank may need to feel the room empty before he will believe anyone was ever in it.31
In that emptiness, something surfaces. Something God placed in reach decades ago. A voice. His wife's voice, perhaps. Or the half-remembered line of a hymn from a funeral he attended under protest. Howard Storm's near-death account documented this exact pattern: darkness first, then a fragment of a remembered hymn, then a cry, then rescue.32
The silence stretches. Frank has spent his whole life filling silence with noise, with argument, with the sound of his own certainty. Now the noise is gone. The arguments have no one to argue with. The certainty has nothing to be certain about. For seventy-eight years, Frank insisted that the room was empty. Now the room is empty. And it turns out that emptiness is not what Frank thought it was. It is not freedom. It is not independence. It is cold. It is vast. It is terrifying in a way Frank has never let himself feel.
In that emptiness, something surfaces that God placed in reach decades ago. A voice. His wife's voice. Or the fragment of a hymn, half-remembered from a funeral he attended under protest. Howard Storm's account documented this exact pattern: darkness first, then a fragment of a remembered hymn, then a cry, then rescue.71
From the dark, Frank does something he has never once done. He calls out. And the Christ who composed the silence answers it. The face of the wife Frank failed stands beside His own.
The real Frank then freely says yes. Or, this chapter stays honest, he may still refuse. We do not know which Frank chose. But we know this: the approach was the best one there could have been. Even the silence was composed.
Insight — What "Optimal" Means
God is not improvising at the bedside. He is not running through options in real time, hoping one works. Middle knowledge means God already knows which approach will reach each soul, and optimal grace means He gives exactly that approach. For Frank, even the silence was part of the design. The emptiness was the first word of the address, not its failure. A God who knows every road to every heart does not leave the most important encounter of a person's existence to chance.
Note the beauty of this. The encounter is not a trick. It is not a manipulation. It is the supreme act of a God who knows every road to every heart and takes the one that leads home. The silence is not cruelty. The darkness is not punishment. It is the approach that love, armed with perfect knowledge, chose for this particular soul. Even the emptiness is a word.
Two guardrails must be stated clearly. First, Frank stays free the whole way. He is free in the darkness, free at the cry, free at the moment of decision. If his "yes" were forced, it would mean nothing. Second, the shadow: this scheme works only if some winning approach exists. If in every feasible encounter Frank would refuse, we face the possibility named in Section 7. That possibility is real, and we will look at it honestly.
Now step back from Frank's bedside and see what has happened. Three streams have converged into a single event. The love of God (Walls) has taken a specific form (the moment-of-death encounter) and has been guided by perfect knowledge (Stratton's Molinism) into the precise approach that Frank needed.
Think of it as three gears in a single machine. Gear one is Walls's optimal grace: the motive. What would a loving God do? He would give the best appeal He can give. Gear two is the moment-of-death encounter: the mechanism. Where and how does the appeal actually land? At the threshold of death, in a subjectively extended meeting with the risen Christ. Gear three is Stratton's Molinism: the architecture. How does God know what the best appeal is? Middle knowledge. Take away any one gear and the machine stutters. Together, they turn smoothly.33
Key Argument — The Synthesis in One Sentence
If God possesses middle knowledge, and if perfect love requires optimal grace, then the moment-of-death encounter is precisely what such a God would do: a tailored, optimal, genuinely resistible meeting with the risen Christ, selected by God out of every possible approach as the one most likely to win each soul's free "yes." The encounter is tailored person by person: overwhelming tenderness for one soul; the staggering relief of being known and not condemned for another; confrontation with a long-fled truth for a third; the face of a loved one for a fourth. And for some, the sequence itself is the tailoring: darkness first, then the dawn.
Why Darkness Can Be Mercy
The idea that a loving God might open some encounters in felt darkness needs more than an illustration. It needs a rationale.34
The rationale has four parts. First, there are souls whose defenses are so deep that a direct confrontation with glory would trigger a reflexive rejection. For such souls, an opening stretch of absence may be the only thing that disarms the defenses. You cannot shatter a wall by throwing light at it. But you can let a person feel what it is like to be truly behind that wall, alone, with no one to impress and no one to fight against. That felt absence is itself a form of honesty.35
Second, the darkness informs without coercing. Talbott has argued powerfully that full information about the consequences of rejection would shatter any illusion that makes rejection attractive.36 The staged encounter finds the truth in Talbott's insight without following it to his conclusion. Full information does not guarantee universal acceptance. But it does strip away the false comforts. The soul that tastes separation in the dark discovers what its "no" actually means, and that discovery is itself a gift. The soul remains free to persist in its "no." But it can no longer pretend it does not know the cost.
Third, the model does not require us to identify, from outside, which souls experienced a dark opening and which did not. The book is agnostic on whether a given dark passage precedes the meeting or follows an initial refusal within the still-open encounter (see Chapter 12 for the empirical pattern and Chapter 19 for the phase dynamics). What matters is that God composes the sequence for each soul, and darkness can be mercy.37
Fourth, Howard Storm's case is the pattern in miniature. Darkness, then the remembered hymn, then the cry, then the rescue. And middle knowledge would say the hymn was never an accident.38
Insight — Why Darkness Can Be Mercy
For some souls, the best possible approach does not begin with light. It begins with silence. The staged encounter informs without coercing: the soul that tastes separation in the dark discovers what its "no" actually means, and that discovery is itself a gift. The soul remains free to persist. But it can no longer pretend it does not know the cost. Even the darkness is composed by a God who knows every road to every heart.
This Is Stronger Than Both of the Usual Alternatives
It helps to see why this model is stronger than the two usual alternatives.
Against postmortem-only views, including intermediate-state proposals about the opportunity coming in Hades or at the final judgment, the dead-agent freedom worry simply does not arise at the threshold. The choice is the last living act of a living person. There is no gap to explain. There is no need to construct a theology of how the dead exercise freedom. The peri-mortem placement avoids the problem altogether.39
Against Craig's antemortem-only Molinism the case is even sharper. Craig holds that God so orders earthly circumstances that everyone who would believe under some possible circumstance actually hears the gospel in this life: this view strains against the unevangelized, infants, and the cognitively disabled. And a merely hypothetical opportunity is not a real one. As James Beilby has argued, it is far better that a person's eternal destiny turn on a choice they consciously and actually make.40 (Chapter 32 surveys Craig's view in one paragraph as its Position 3 and links here for the developed treatment.)
Insight — The Best of Both Alternatives
The moment-of-death encounter takes the best of both alternatives and leaves the weaknesses behind. From the postmortem proposals, it keeps the insistence on a real, conscious opportunity for every person. From the antemortem Molinism, it keeps the insistence on genuine freedom and a living agent. It avoids the dead-agent problem on one side and the hypothetical-opportunity problem on the other.
Stratton's architecture develops the metaphysics of middle knowledge in depth, but he never says where in a person's existence the decisive circumstance lies. The moment-of-death thesis fills the slot. Stratton built the house; the moment-of-death thesis proposes who is at the door.41
God's Eternal Endgame: The "Maximal Harvest World"
Stratton uses a powerful phrase: God's "eternal endgame." The ultimate defeat of evil. The salvation of all who can be saved. The greatest harvest of free souls that any possible world could yield.42
Working with the philosopher Jacobus Erasmus, Stratton develops the idea of a "maximal harvest world." Among all feasible worlds, a perfectly wise and loving God would actualize one in which evil is ultimately defeated and all who are not transworld damned are saved. Nobody who would say yes is denied the chance to say it.43
Primary Source — Stratton and Erasmus on the Maximal Harvest World
Stratton and Erasmus write that God, in selecting a world to create, weighs the possibilities. God actualizes a world in which evil is ultimately defeated and all who freely respond to His grace are saved. They add the honest bracket: this "leave[s] room for hopeful universalism," even as they append: "Neither Erasmus nor I are universalists." The hope is real. The guarantee is not.44
The phrase "maximal harvest world" is striking. It captures the idea that God does not settle for less than the best possible outcome. Among all the feasible worlds, God does not pick randomly. He does not pick the easiest. He picks the one that brings the most people freely home. The harvest is as large as free human choices allow it to be.
The hope this generates is staggering. If God has actualized a maximal harvest world, then the number of the saved may be far larger than any tradition has dared to imagine. We do not know the number. But the architecture suggests that the harvest is vast.
The moment-of-death encounter is the instrument of this harvest. It is the great gathering-in, where God's middle knowledge and God's universal love meet each soul, one at a time, with the best possible appeal. The encounter is the mechanism by which the maximal harvest world becomes actual: soul by soul, approach by approach, each one tailored to the person who stands at the threshold.
The Hard Edge: Transworld Damnation
We promised at the start not to dodge the sad part. Here it is.
Alvin Plantinga coined the idea of "transworld depravity": the possibility that a person might freely go wrong in every feasible world. William Lane Craig applied the idea to salvation and gave it the name transworld damnation: a person who, in every feasible world and under every possible appeal, would still freely refuse God.45
Walls engages this idea directly in Hell. He reframes "the unsaved" as those who decisively reject optimal grace "either in this life or after death." He argues that those who die unevangelized do not automatically suffer transworld damnation. They simply have not yet had the chance to respond under optimal conditions. The unsaved, in Walls's view, are those who have received optimal grace and still refused.46
Walls also argues that in the world God has chosen, "no one would be lost in this world who would be saved in some other feasible world."47 If there is any feasible world in which a person would freely say yes, then God gives that person the measure of grace to which they would freely respond. No one is lost by accident. No one is lost for lack of effort on God's part.
The Sobering Possibility
If transworld damnation is real, it means that some souls, under every possible appeal, in every possible arrangement of circumstances, would still freely refuse God's love. This is not a comfortable idea. But three things must be said immediately. First, it does not say God gave up on anyone. It is what maximal love met by constant refusal would look like. Second, it does not say we can identify who such persons are. No one can point to a neighbor, a parent, or a stranger and say "that person is transworld damned." This is a humbler position than both the confident universalist and the confident restrictivist. Third, it does not impugn God's justice. If transworld damnation is real, it answers Sarah's question with an unqualified yes: God did everything He could. And it strengthens the justice of any final judgment, because nobody can say they never had a real chance.
What does transworld damnation look like from the inside? Not a person who says "I know God is love and I reject Him anyway." That would be cartoonish. Think instead of the person described in Chapter 27: a will so formed by decades of self-deception, disordered love, and proud refusal that even the most loving, most fully informed appeal cannot pry it open. Not because the appeal was too weak. Not because God did not try hard enough. But because the soul itself, in the unfathomable depths of its own freedom, has become something that cannot receive what is offered. The door is not locked from the outside. It is locked from the inside.
The concept is painful. But it is also, in a strange way, hopeful. Because if transworld damnation is the only way a soul can be finally lost, then no one is lost for lack of opportunity. No one is lost because the gospel never reached them. No one is lost because they lived in the wrong century or the wrong country. Every soul that is lost, if any are, is lost despite having received the very best approach that infinite love and perfect knowledge could provide. That is a different kind of tragedy than the one most people fear. It is not the tragedy of abandonment. It is the tragedy of freedom.
Connect this back to Chapter 27. Transworld damnation is the philosophical name for what that chapter described pastorally: formed character, disordered loves, Augustine's bent will that does not automatically straighten when shown the supreme Good. A soul that has spent decades forming itself in pride, bitterness, or contempt may carry that formation into every feasible encounter. The encounter brings clarity. It does not force transformation.48
An Honest Tension: Does Molinism Point Toward Universalism?
Fairness demands that we lay the strongest opposing argument on the table at full strength.
Andrew Hronich, building on the proposal of the philosopher Jason Marsh, has argued that an infinitely resourceful God could add persons to a world one at a time, creating only those who would, in some feasible circumstance, freely accept God's grace. Any individual who would jeopardize a universal harvest is simply not created. On this view, God can "weakly actualize" a world in which everyone freely responds to grace and is reconciled to Him.49
Hronich introduces a striking mirror-image term: transworld sanctity. If transworld damnation means a person who would refuse God in every feasible world, transworld sanctity means a person who would accept God in at least one feasible circumstance. Hronich wonders whether anyone is truly constant in refusal across all possible worlds. And he explicitly leaves room for the free "yes" to come at the moment of death.50
The analytic philosopher R. Zachary Manis presses the same tension with even sharper tools. Manis is no universalist. But in his chapter "Providence, Freedom, and God's Creation of the Damned," he grants that Molinism "seems to be a perfect match" for universalism. If God can select which world to create, and if God knows what every free creature would do in every circumstance, then why would God not simply create the world in which everyone freely says yes?51
Manis then constructs a position he calls "Molinist Anti-Universalism," or M-AU: the view that holds middle knowledge while denying that any universalist world was feasible. Jerry Walls is named as M-AU's defender. But Manis finds the position wanting. He concludes that M-AU is "metaphysically dubious at best," and delivers a verdict that has echoed through the literature: "whereas Molinism and universalism may well be a match made in heaven, Molinism and anti-universalism are, if not quite a match made in hell, at least ill-wed." Anti-universalists, Manis argues, "are best served to reject Molinism altogether."52
Common Objection — Does Molinism Point Toward Universalism?
Hronich and Manis argue, from different angles, that Molinism fits more naturally with universalism than with any view that allows some to be lost. If God can select which feasible world to create, why would He not create the world where everyone freely says yes? The argument is strong, and this book does not pretend otherwise.
The weight of Manis's verdict cannot be overstated. He is not a universalist. He is an analytic philosopher who has spent a career thinking about hell, freedom, and the character of God. When a non-universalist says that Molinism fits more naturally with universalism than with anti-universalism, the honest response is not to dismiss the observation but to sit with it.
The Molinist reply comes from Craig. Not every logically possible world is feasible. A feasible world is one that the true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom make available. The universalist's dream world may not be on the menu. Not because God lacks power, but because a forced "yes" is not free. If some persons would freely refuse God in every feasible arrangement, then no feasible world achieves universal salvation without overriding someone's freedom.53
The debate is unresolved. The honest thinker must sit with both possibilities. Perhaps every person, in at least one feasible circumstance, would freely say yes, and God has created a world in which every person encounters that circumstance. If so, the harvest is universal. Perhaps some persons, in every feasible circumstance, would freely refuse, and the best God can do is minimize their number while maximizing the saved. If so, the harvest is vast but not complete.
And here is the honest admission. We do not know which side is right. Only God knows the true counterfactuals. Stratton himself concedes that the bracketed words in his passage "leave room for hopeful universalism," even as he declines to embrace it.54
Land here, on the book's eschatological neutrality. Hope held in one hand, the sober possibility in the other. We hope all are saved. We fear some, in the dreadful freedom of a will bent against love, may refuse. We do not know the number and are not asked to (see Chapter 29 for the full treatment of this neutrality).
Insight — Where Hope and Honesty Meet
The moment-of-death encounter is the best news the universalist hope and the sober realist can both stand under. It tells the universalist: yes, every person receives the best possible appeal, and the harvest may be vast. It tells the realist: yes, freedom is deep enough that some may still refuse, and that refusal is genuine. It holds the hope and the honesty together without pretending the tension is resolved. Only God knows the number. We are not asked to know it. We are asked to trust the God who knows every road to every soul.
Why Would God Create Anyone He Knew Would Refuse?
If God knew, by middle knowledge, that some persons would refuse Him in every feasible encounter, why create them at all? This is the hardest question the model faces.
Craig's answer is the interconnection reply. Human lives are woven together. The person you are, and the circumstances in which you might freely turn to God, are shaped by countless others. Your grandmother's faith shaped your mother's character, which shaped the world you grew up in, which shaped the moment you were ready to hear the gospel. Pull one thread, and the whole tapestry shifts. The world in which the greatest number freely come home may unavoidably contain some who freely refuse.55
To put it more bluntly: in order to fill heaven, God may have to permit hell to be filled. This is not because God wants anyone lost. It is because human lives are interconnected, and the feasible world that saves the most people may not be one from which every refuser can be removed without unraveling the fabric that brought others to faith.56
An analogy may help, though all analogies limp. Think of a family reunion organized by a grandmother who knows every member of her large family. She knows that if she seats Uncle Robert next to Cousin James, they will argue all night and ruin the evening for everyone. She knows that if she invites Aunt Helen, Helen's presence will bring out the best in three other relatives who would otherwise stay home. She cannot invite everyone and seat them however she likes. The combinations matter. The best reunion, the one that brings the most joy to the most family members, may be one in which a few difficult relatives are present. They are not excluded. They are invited. They are loved. But their presence is the unavoidable shadow of a gathering arranged to bring the most people together in joy.
Guard the misreading. God does not want anyone lost. The lost, if any, are the tragic shadow of a world arranged to save the most people possible.
MacGregor adds an important refinement from Molina himself. Molina held an optimal balance principle: God considers for creation only worlds with no more of the lost than are necessary to achieve the greatest salvation. God is minimizing loss, not running up numbers.57
Then a humbling wrinkle. Molina himself believed that no possible individual is depraved enough to refuse God's grace in all available circumstances. And no individual is good enough to accept in all circumstances either. This relocates the source of any loss from unsavable persons to the limits of compossibility. That is a big word for a simple idea: it means that some combinations of free creatures simply cannot coexist in the same world. It is not that any one person is beyond reach. It is that the combination of all persons in one world may make some losses unavoidable.58
Primary Source — Molina via MacGregor
MacGregor reports that Molina held a striking optimism: no individual essence is so fixed in evil that it would refuse God in every feasible circumstance, and no essence is so fixed in good that it would accept in every circumstance. The problem is not unsavable persons but unsavable combinations. God selects the world with the optimal balance: the greatest number saved, the fewest lost, with optimal grace given to all. Even on the hardest reading, God is not abandoning anyone. He is choosing, out of every feasible world, the one that brings the most people home.59
One final matter before we close this section. Walls raises the missionary objection to Craig's antemortem scheme. If those who die unevangelized are lost only because they were transworld damned anyway, why carry the gospel to them at all? In Hell, Walls frames and answers this objection himself. The unevangelized are not automatically transworld damned. They simply have not yet had the opportunity to respond under optimal conditions. The gospel remains urgent because it is part of how God prepares hearts for the ultimate encounter.60
The missionary objection is one of the most practical worries in the whole debate. If God gives everyone a chance at death, why bother sharing the gospel now? The question is sincere. And the answer matters for the church.
The moment-of-death model dissolves this objection entirely. On this book's view, no one is written off in advance. No one's loss is a statistic tolerated for the totals. Every soul, reached and unreached alike, receives a personal, optimal, free invitation at the threshold of death. Evangelism is not rendered pointless. It is rendered precious. We will return to this in the pastoral close.
Three Honest Objections
Objection 1: "Middle knowledge is itself disputed. You are building on a contested foundation."
Conceded openly. The grounding objection to Molinism asks what makes the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom true. Stratton engages this question at length, and there is a growing literature defending Molinism against the challenge.61 But the chapter's claim is deliberately modest and conditional. If Molinism is true, it fits the moment-of-death encounter like a key fits a lock. But this book's central thesis does not stand or fall with Molinism. The encounter can be affirmed by anyone who believes God is omniscient and loving, whether or not they accept the specific architecture of middle knowledge. Molinism is an illuminating frame, not a load-bearing wall.
Objection 2: "If God already knows by middle knowledge how each person would respond, is the actual encounter not just theater?"
This objection has real force. If God already knows how Frank will respond, what is the point of the encounter? Is Frank just going through motions that are already settled?
No. Counterfactual knowledge of what Frank would do is not the actual doing. Destiny turns on what the real Frank actually, freely does in the real corridor. Middle knowledge tells God which door to open. It does not walk Frank through it. The advantage of this model over purely hypothetical schemes is precisely that the encounter is real, not hypothetical. Frank actually meets Christ. Frank actually decides.62
Objection 3: "Does 'choosing the best approach' make God a manipulator running a sales technique on the dying?"
Consider a parent with two frightened children. The parent knows that one child needs to be held and another needs to be spoken to firmly. There is nothing manipulative about a parent who knows what each child needs and gives it. That is not a sales technique. That is love. Tailoring the appeal is what love does when love also has perfect knowledge. And the response stays free. The child who is held can still push away. The child who is spoken to firmly can still refuse to listen.63
The Pastoral Heart of It
Everything in this chapter was finally for Sarah.
She sits at her father's bedside. The monitors are slowing. And the question she has carried for thirty years is the question the chapter set out to answer: Did God do everything He could?
The chapter's answer is the strongest yes this book knows how to give. Out of every possible way the risen Christ could have met her hard, weary, walled-off father in the corridor of his dying, God knew the very best one and gave him exactly that. Not a generic offer. Not a pamphlet left on a doorstep. The face of the One who made him, in the single most persuasive form God knew would reach him.64
The specificity is what gives this comfort its power. It is not the vague reassurance that "God is love" or "God works in mysterious ways." It is the precise claim that God knew the best road to Frank's heart and took it. He knew whether tenderness or confrontation would reach Frank. He knew whether the face of Frank's wife or the voice of a long-forgotten friend would break through. He knew whether silence or song would disarm the walls. And He gave Frank exactly that. The encounter was not a chance meeting. It was a composed masterpiece of love, written for an audience of one.
No false comfort. This book will not promise Sarah that Frank said yes. False comfort is its own cruelty. But she can lay down one particular torment: the fear that her father slipped away uninvited, unreached, lost in the dark for lack of a fair chance. There was a chance. It was the best chance there could be. It was given.
What about the Franks who say no? What about the souls who, despite everything, choose to stand outside? The image Scripture gives us is not a dungeon door slamming. It is something sadder and gentler.
Think of the prodigal's older brother in Luke 15:25–32. Standing outside the party. Fully invited. Refusing to come in. That is the picture of whatever souls are finally lost, if any are: not shut out, but invited with everything heaven has, and choosing to stand outside. The Father does not lock the door. The Father comes out and pleads.65
Then the second gift, for the living. The optimal encounter does not make our witness pointless. It makes it precious. Every act of love, every prayer, every word of truth spoken gently to a Frank in our own lives is a softening of the walls. It is part of how God prepares a heart so that when the great encounter comes, the heart is more ready to say yes than it would otherwise have been. This is the truth behind Chapter 27's discussion of formed character, read in reverse: if character can harden a soul against the encounter, then love can soften a soul toward it. Every prayer Sarah prayed for thirty years was not wasted. It was part of the approach God was composing.66
We close where we began, with three words for the living.
We hope. The harvest may be vast. The God who knows every road to every soul may bring home more than we dare to imagine. The model we have described in this chapter is the engine of that hope. If God has middle knowledge, if He gives optimal grace, and if the moment-of-death encounter is the mechanism by which that grace lands, then the scope of the harvest is not limited by geography, culture, or century. It is limited only by freedom. And even there, we do not know the number.
We labor. Our love now is part of how God prepares hearts for then. Our witness is not replaced by the encounter. It is woven into it. Every prayer Sarah prayed for thirty years was part of the approach. Every act of kindness, every word of truth, every moment of patience with a stubborn father was a loosening of the mortar between the bricks. When the great encounter came, the walls were not as thick as they would have been without her. That is the preciousness of our witness. It is not pointless. It is part of God's composition.
We trust. We trust the God who knows every road to every soul to do, for each one, the best possible thing. We trust the God who stepped into time and a body to meet us. We trust the God who composed even the silence at Frank's bedside. We trust the God who did not leave the seventy-eight-year-old skeptic without an invitation. Because that is exactly the kind of God He is.
Notes
↑ 1. Jerry L. Walls, Hell: The Logic of Damnation, Library of Religious Philosophy 9 (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), ch. 4, "Hell and Divine Goodness," §II. Walls introduces the concept in the context of addressing Wesley's concern about those who never hear the gospel.
↑ 2. Walls, Hell, ch. 4, §II.
↑ 3. Walls, Hell, ch. 4, §II.
↑ 4. Walls, Hell, ch. 4, §II. This passage is central to understanding that optimal grace is not a uniform distribution but a personally tailored one.
↑ 5. Jerry L. Walls, Purgatory: The Logic of Total Transformation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), ch. 5, "Purgatory and Theories of a 'Second Chance,'" section "When Seconds Matter."
↑ 6. Walls, Purgatory, ch. 5, "When Seconds Matter."
↑ 7. "Peri-mortem" (from the Greek peri, "around") refers to the threshold between life and death, the liminal moment at the boundary. "Post-mortem" (from the Latin post, "after") refers to the state after death has occurred. For the full development of the distinction and its implications, see Chapters 16–19.
↑ 8. This is the distinctive contribution of the moment-of-death thesis relative to other postmortem proposals. See James Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity: A Biblical, Historical, and Theological Assessment (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, forthcoming), for the range of proposals and the freedom question that attends each.
↑ 9. Walls, Hell, ch. 4, §II. Walls is discussing a scenario in which a young woman dies before she has had a fair opportunity to respond to the gospel. He argues that God "could bring about the appropriate favorable circumstances during the passage of death."
↑ 10. Walls, Hell, ch. 4, §II. The peri-mortem reach is embedded in Walls's broader argument about the Luther/Erasmus problem: if one person's deprivation is necessary for another's salvation, God could make up for that deprivation at the time of death.
↑ 11. Luis de Molina, Concordia (1588). For a modern treatment, see Thomas P. Flint, Divine Providence: The Molinist Account (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998); William Lane Craig, The Only Wise God: The Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1987).
↑ 12. Timothy A. Stratton, Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism: A Biblical, Historical, Theological, and Philosophical Analysis, 2nd ed. (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2026), ch. 13, "A Spaniard Named Luis de Molina (AD 1535–1600)." Stratton's accessible summary of the three moments is the clearest available for a general audience.
↑ 13. Craig, The Only Wise God, 127–34. Craig's account of the three moments of divine knowledge remains the standard philosophical treatment in the analytic tradition.
↑ 14. The term "logical moments" is crucial. They describe a logical priority, not a temporal sequence. God does not learn middle knowledge and then decide to create. God's knowledge is eternal and complete. The moments describe the structure of that knowledge, not a process. See Stratton, Mere Molinism, 2nd ed., ch. 13.
↑ 15. Craig, The Only Wise God, 131. Craig writes that God "can have a measure of providential control in a world of free creatures" precisely because He knows in advance what they would freely choose in any circumstance.
↑ 16. Stratton, Mere Molinism, 2nd ed., ch. 15, "Arguments for Middle Knowledge and Mere Molinism." Stratton explicitly parallels Lewis's project in Mere Christianity (1952).
↑ 17. Stratton, Mere Molinism, 2nd ed., ch. 15. See also Timothy A. Stratton and Jacobus Erasmus, "Two Pillars of Molinism," Perichoresis (2020): 17–29.
↑ 18. To be precise: libertarian freedom holds that a free choice is one where the agent (a) had genuine alternative possibilities and (b) was the ultimate source of the choice, not determined by prior causes. It is the majority position among analytic philosophers of action. See Robert Kane, The Significance of Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). Note that "libertarian" here refers to the philosophical position on free will, not to the political party of the same name.
↑ 19. Stratton, Mere Molinism, 2nd ed., ch. 12, "Philosophical Arguments for Libertarian Freedom." Stratton calls this "the free-thinking argument (hereafter, FTA)." The core insight is that if determinism is true, then even the determinist's belief that determinism is true is itself determined, not rationally evaluated. This creates a self-referential problem for the determinist.
↑ 20. Stratton, Mere Molinism, 2nd ed., ch. 15, "Arguments for Middle Knowledge and Mere Molinism," under the subheading "Why Would God Want To?"
↑ 21. Stratton, Mere Molinism, 2nd ed., ch. 15. The full passage reads: "God can choose to create humans in his image—beings who possess the ability to freely choose among a range of alternative options, each of which is consistent with their nature at the moment of choice. And since God is omniscient, he knows exactly how these free creatures would freely choose in every possible circumstance. He sovereignly actualizes a world in which their genuinely free choices align with his perfect eternal endgame and bring him ultimate glory."
↑ 22. 1 Samuel 23:11–13 (ESV). David is at Keilah; God answers two counterfactual questions about what Saul and the men of Keilah would do. David acts on the information, and neither event occurs.
↑ 23. Kirk R. MacGregor, Luis de Molina: The Life and Theology of the Founder of Middle Knowledge (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2015). MacGregor's observation is also noted in Stratton, Mere Molinism, 2nd ed., ch. 2, "Biblical Foundations."
↑ 24. This is the essential distinction between middle knowledge and mere guessing. A fortune-teller offers a probability. Middle knowledge is certain knowledge of what free agents would freely choose in circumstances that may never be actualized. See Flint, Divine Providence, 36–50.
↑ 25. Exodus 32:10–14. God's stated plan changes in response to Moses' intercession, which is consistent with the Molinist picture of God acting in response to foreknown free choices. See Stratton, Mere Molinism, 2nd ed., ch. 15.
↑ 26. Jeremiah 38:17–18. Two divergent futures are laid before Zedekiah, each contingent on his free choice. See Stratton, Mere Molinism, 2nd ed., ch. 15.
↑ 27. Stratton, Mere Molinism, 2nd ed., ch. 14, "A Biblical Case for Molinism," notes section on Matthew 11:21–24. MacGregor, Luis de Molina, treats the passage similarly.
↑ 28. Stratton notes Craig's demurral in the same set of notes on Matthew 11:21–24 in Mere Molinism, 2nd ed., ch. 14. Even on a hyperbolic reading, the words assume knowledge of what these cities would have done.
↑ 29. Stratton, Mere Molinism, 2nd ed., ch. 14, notes. Stratton's perseverance distinction draws on 1 Corinthians 13:8 and Jesus' parable of the sower (Matt 13:20–21). A burst of emotional repentance is not the same as "a freely chosen, persevering love relationship with God."
↑ 30. Stratton, Mere Molinism, 2nd ed., ch. 13, "A Spaniard Named Luis de Molina." Stratton uses the Peter illustration to show middle knowledge in action: Jesus knew what Peter would freely do in the courtyard, and Peter was not forced.
↑ 31. The theological rationale for the staged encounter is developed here; the NDE empirical pattern (darkness first, then rescue) is owned by Chapter 12; the phenomenological phase dynamics by Chapter 19; the working-model variation by Appendix O.
↑ 32. Howard Storm, My Descent into Death: A Second Chance at Life (New York: Doubleday, 2005). Storm's account of his NDE includes a period of darkness, an experience of hostile beings, a remembered fragment of a hymn ("Jesus loves me, this I know"), a desperate cry, and a rescue by a being of light. See Chapter 12 for the full discussion.
↑ 33. The "three gears" image is meant to show how the three streams depend on one another. Without Walls's motive, the encounter is unexplained love. Without the moment-of-death mechanism, the love has no landing point. Without Stratton's architecture, the tailoring has no explanation. Together, they constitute a single, coherent model.
↑ 34. The sequenced or "staged" encounter is a Revision 4 development in this book. The theological rationale is owned by this chapter; Chapter 12 owns the NDE empirical evidence; Chapter 19 owns the phase dynamics; and Appendix O carries the working-model variation.
↑ 35. The distinction between absence as the failure of God's presence and absence as the first word of God's address is crucial. In the latter case, the darkness is itself part of the approach. See Nancy K. Frankenberry, "Religion and the Varieties of Perception," in Perceiving God, ed. Jerome Gellman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), for the philosophical case that apparent absence can be a form of presence.
↑ 36. Thomas Talbott, The Inescapable Love of God, 2nd ed. (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2014). Talbott's argument about the power of full information to shatter illusions is engaged at length in Chapter 25.
↑ 37. The book is agnostic on whether a given dark passage precedes the meeting or follows an initial refusal within the still-open encounter. See Chapter 12 for the agnostic reading and Chapter 19 for the phase-model variant.
↑ 38. Storm, My Descent into Death. The remembered hymn is arguably the most theologically suggestive detail in Storm's account. If middle knowledge is real, then the hymn Storm heard as a child was never an accident; it was a seed planted decades before the harvest.
↑ 39. For the range of postmortem proposals and the freedom question that attends each, see Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity; also Stephen Jonathan, Grace beyond the Grave (London: Bloomsbury, 2021).
↑ 40. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity. Beilby argues that it is "far better that a person's eternal destiny turn on a choice they consciously and actually make" than on a hypothetical response God knows they would have given. The moment-of-death encounter gives them exactly that: a real choice, not a hypothetical one.
↑ 41. The image is deliberately architectural. Stratton's Mere Molinism develops the metaphysical framework (the house: middle knowledge, libertarian freedom, the three moments). The moment-of-death thesis identifies the decisive circumstance (who is at the door: the dying person, met by the risen Christ). The two were developed independently; their fit is the argument.
↑ 42. Stratton, Mere Molinism, 2nd ed., ch. 14, "A Biblical Case for Molinism," notes. The "eternal endgame" is Stratton's term for God's ultimate purpose in creation: the defeat of evil, the salvation of all who can be saved, and the glorification of God through the free worship of redeemed creatures.
↑ 43. Stratton, Mere Molinism, 2nd ed., ch. 14. See also Stratton and Erasmus, "Two Pillars of Molinism."
↑ 44. Stratton, Mere Molinism, 2nd ed., ch. 14, notes. The bracketed wording about those who are transworld damned is original. The appended note reads: "Neither Erasmus nor I are universalists."
↑ 45. William Lane Craig, "'No Other Name': A Middle Knowledge Perspective on the Exclusivity of Salvation through Christ," Faith and Philosophy 6, no. 2 (1989): 172–88. Craig adapted Plantinga's "transworld depravity" from The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974) to the soteriological domain. See also Craig, The Only Wise God, 135–42.
↑ 46. Walls, Hell, ch. 4, §III. Walls reframes the question of the unsaved: those who die unevangelized are not necessarily transworld damned. They simply have not yet received optimal grace under conditions that permit a decisive response.
↑ 47. Walls, Hell, ch. 4, §III. Walls states: "no one would be lost in this world who would be saved in some other feasible world."
↑ 48. See Chapter 27 for the full treatment of formed character, self-deception, disordered loves, and the conditions under which genuine refusal remains possible even under optimal grace. See also Walls, Hell, ch. 5, "Hell and Human Freedom," §V, on self-deception as "compatible with being fully informed."
↑ 49. Andrew Hronich, Once Loved, Always Loved, ch. 1, "Of God and Men." Hronich builds on Jason Marsh's proposal; see Jason Marsh, "Do the Counterfactuals of Divine Freedom Support Molinist Anti-Universalism?" Faith and Philosophy (forthcoming). Hronich's argument is that God can weakly actualize a world in which all freely respond by carefully selecting which individuals to instantiate.
↑ 50. Hronich, Once Loved, Always Loved, ch. 1. Hronich defines two forms of transworld sanctity (T1 and T2) and argues that God could create only individuals who possess at least T1. He explicitly notes that the free "yes" could come at the moment of death, making his argument compatible with the thesis of this book.
↑ 51. R. Zachary Manis, Sinners in the Presence of a Loving God: A New Vision of Judgment and Hell (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2023), "Providence, Freedom, and God's Creation of the Damned," the section "Molinism and Universalism," ca. p. 120.
↑ 52. Manis, Sinners in the Presence of a Loving God, 134. The full verdict reads: "I conclude that, whereas Molinism and universalism may well be a match made in heaven, Molinism and anti-universalism are, if not quite a match made in hell, at least ill-wed." Manis constructs M-AU (Molinist Anti-Universalism, ca. p. 126) with Jerry Walls named as its defender, and finds the position wanting. Hronich quotes this verdict in Once Loved, Always Loved, ch. 1.
↑ 53. Craig, "'No Other Name,'" 180–84. Craig's feasibility argument is that the true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom constrain which worlds God can actualize. A world in which everyone freely says yes may not be among the feasible options.
↑ 54. Stratton, Mere Molinism, 2nd ed., ch. 14. Stratton's note: "Neither Erasmus nor I are universalists." But the bracketed concession shows that the model permits the hope without requiring it.
↑ 55. Craig, "'No Other Name,'" 182–84. Craig's interconnection argument is that the salvation-relevant circumstances of one person may be intertwined with the existence and free choices of other persons, making it impossible to "subtract" the lost without unraveling the conditions that brought others to faith.
↑ 56. The "fill heaven / permit hell" formulation is a paraphrase of Craig's argument. Craig's own words are more careful: the feasible world that maximizes salvation may not be one from which every refuser can be removed. See Craig, "'No Other Name,'" 184.
↑ 57. MacGregor, Luis de Molina. MacGregor details Molina's insistence that God would never create a world with more lost souls than strictly necessary. This is the "optimal balance" principle: God minimizes loss while maximizing the number saved.
↑ 58. MacGregor, Luis de Molina. Molina held that no individual essence is so fixed in evil that it would refuse God in every feasible circumstance. The source of any loss is not unsavable persons but the limits of compossibility: which combinations of free persons can coexist in the same feasible world.
↑ 59. MacGregor, Luis de Molina. On Molina's optimism about individual essences, see also Walls, Hell, ch. 4, §IV, where Walls states that God "saves the highest number or proportion he can, while giving all persons an optimal measure of grace."
↑ 60. Walls, Hell, ch. 4, §III. Walls raises and answers the missionary objection himself. If the unevangelized are not automatically lost, does that remove the urgency of missions? Walls argues it does not: evangelism is part of how God distributes optimal grace in this life, and the encounter at death does not replace it but completes it. See Chapter 32 for the full treatment of the missionary-motivation question.
↑ 61. The grounding objection asks: what makes the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom true? If the truthmaker is God's decree, then the freedom seems illusory. If there is no truthmaker, what grounds the truth? Stratton addresses the objection in Mere Molinism, 2nd ed., ch. 15, drawing on William Lane Craig's response and on philosophers who question the necessity of truth-makers, including Merricks, Tallant, and others. The debate remains live, but the grounding objection is no longer the conversation-stopper it once appeared to be.
↑ 62. The distinction between counterfactual knowledge and actual occurrence is fundamental to Molinism. God's knowing what Frank would do is not the same as Frank's actually doing it. The encounter is the actualization of the counterfactual: the real Frank, in the real corridor, making a real choice. See Craig, The Only Wise God, ch. 7.
↑ 63. The parent analogy is deliberately ordinary. The charge of manipulation assumes that knowledge of another person's needs is itself coercive. But this is absurd in any human context. A good therapist, a good friend, a good parent all tailor their words to the person in front of them. What makes divine tailoring different is not that it is manipulative but that it is perfect.
↑ 64. The pastoral payoff of the synthesis is that it replaces generic comfort with specific comfort. The issue is not "God loves everyone" (true but vague). The issue is "God loved your father with a love that knew every road to his heart, and gave him the very best approach." That is the difference between a pamphlet and a person.
↑ 65. Luke 15:25–32. The older brother stands outside the banquet and refuses the father's invitation. The father comes out and pleads with him. The parable leaves the older brother's response unresolved. This is the Bible's own image of the refusal: invited, pursued, and still standing outside.
↑ 66. The relationship between antemortem witness and the moment-of-death encounter is synergistic, not competitive. Every prayer, every act of love, every word of truth spoken to a resistant soul in this life is part of God's long composition. It softens the walls that would otherwise be harder to break through at the encounter. See Chapter 27 on the formation of character. The same formation that can harden a soul against the encounter can, when shaped by the prayers and love of others, soften a soul toward it.
↑ 67. Walls, Hell, ch. 4, §II. Walls's insistence that a decisive response is a "settled" and "rooted disposition" distinguishes the moment-of-death encounter from a coerced last-second panic. The encounter, subjectively extended, gives room for a genuinely settled response.
↑ 68. Walls, Hell, ch. 4, §II. Walls writes: "It is also important to stress that optimal grace does not require the absence of all adversity and trial. Indeed, since the response of faith includes a moral dimension, a certain element of trial may be a necessary component of optimal grace."
↑ 69. For the historical context, see MacGregor, Luis de Molina. The debate between the Jesuits and the Dominicans on grace and freedom (de auxiliis controversy) was one of the defining theological disputes of the Counter-Reformation period. Molina's Concordia (1588) was his attempt to resolve it.
↑ 70. The distinction between optimal grace and irresistible grace is theologically precise. Irresistible grace (the "I" in the Calvinist TULIP) holds that God's saving grace always achieves its intended effect in the elect. Optimal grace holds that God gives the best grace He can give to every person, but the person remains free to refuse. The two concepts share the conviction that God's grace is powerful; they differ on whether it is finally resistible. See Walls, Hell, ch. 4, §II; cf. Heaven, Hell, and Purgatory (Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2015), 81.
↑ 71. Storm, My Descent into Death. The detail of the half-remembered hymn fragment surfacing in the darkness is the most suggestive element of Storm's account for the purposes of this chapter. On a Molinist reading, the hymn was planted in childhood by a God who knew it would surface at the decisive moment.