Chapter 4

God’s Universal Salvific Will and the Problem of the Unevangelized

Billions who never heard, and the God who will not let them go

Her name was Mei. She was born around the year 230 in a farming village deep in inland China. She married young. She raised four children. She was kind to her neighbors, careful with her ancestors’ rites, and faithful to the moral code her culture handed down. She never stole, never lied when it mattered, never turned a hungry stranger away from her door.

Mei died at forty-three. She had never heard the name of Jesus. Not once. Not in a garbled form, not from a passing trader, not in a dream. The gospel simply had not arrived in her province. It would not arrive for another thousand years.

I think about Mei a lot. And I think about what most of us have been taught to say about her.

If salvation requires a conscious, personal act of faith in Jesus Christ, and if Mei never once had a chance to exercise that faith, then we are left with a hard set of options. Maybe God chose not to save her. Maybe she managed to grope her way to an “implicit faith” through nature alone. Maybe God somehow got the gospel to her in a way history does not record. Or maybe she is simply lost, through no fault of her own, and we are told not to ask questions.

None of those answers has ever sat right with me. And if you are honest, I suspect none of them sits right with you either.

This chapter is about Mei. It is also about Anna, a baby girl who died at six months, and Sam, a man born with a disability so profound he could never process a sentence, let alone a sermon. And it is about millions upon millions of people just like them.

Here is the blunt question. God “desires all people to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth” (1 Timothy 2:4). We established that in Chapter 2. But billions of human beings have died without ever once hearing that truth. So has God’s desire failed? And not failed in a handful of tragic cases, but on a scale so vast it makes the word “failure” feel too small?

Or does the offer reach them somewhere other than this life?

This book takes the second path. And it extends the offer further than you might expect.

The Scale No One Talks About

We need to feel the weight of the numbers before we reach for answers. Demographers estimate that roughly 100 to 110 billion human beings have been born since our species first appeared.1 The gospel is about two thousand years old. For most of those two millennia, it was confined to a relatively thin band of the globe. Even today, after centuries of missions, there are people groups who have never been contacted.

Think about what that means. The vast majority of all humans who have ever drawn breath lived and died without a clear presentation of the gospel of Jesus Christ. Most of them lived before Christ was born. Many lived after, but in places the message had not reached. Some heard a version so twisted by the cruelty or ignorance of the messenger that calling it “the gospel” is generous.

Add to that the babies. Infant and childhood mortality before the modern era was staggering. In many centuries, one in three children did not survive past age five.2 These little ones never had the mental capacity to understand anything about Jesus, let alone place their faith in him.

Add to that the profoundly disabled. Through every era and every culture, there have been people born with cognitive conditions so severe that the concept of a “gospel presentation” is meaningless for them. They are loved by God. They bear his image. But they could not understand a sermon if you gave them a lifetime to listen.

All of these people, taken together, almost certainly outnumber every person who has ever heard and understood the Christian gospel.

I want to say this plainly, because we glide past it too quickly. This is not a problem about a handful of hard cases in a philosophy classroom. This is a problem about most of the human race. If your theology of salvation cannot account for the majority of humanity, it is not a complete theology. It might be true as far as it goes. But it does not go far enough.

Key Argument. The soteriological problem of the unevangelized is not a fringe puzzle for academic theologians. It is a problem about the majority of all human beings who have ever lived. Any theology that cannot account for their fate is a theology with a hole at its center.

James Beilby puts the issue with sharp clarity. The problem of the unevangelized comes down to three statements that, taken alone, most Christians would accept without hesitation:

(1) God desires that all people have an opportunity to be saved.
(2) Responding to the gospel of Jesus Christ with explicit faith is necessary for salvation.
(3) Some die without having heard the gospel.3

Any two of these can live together comfortably. All three together create a tension that demands a response. As Beilby observes, the history of Christian theology on this question is really the history of which statement gets denied or softened.4

The Standard Answers and Where They Strain

Christians have not ignored this question. They have offered several answers. I want to be fair to each one, because each contains something true. But I also want to be honest about where each one bends under the weight of the cases we are about to meet.

Restrictivism

Restrictivists hold that salvation requires hearing and responding to the gospel with explicit faith, and that those who never hear are lost. The logic is clean. Romans 10:14 asks, “How can they believe in the one of whom they have not heard?” The answer, on this view, is that they cannot. The urgency of missions follows directly: if no one else brings the gospel, those people will perish.5

Restrictivism takes sin seriously. It takes the Great Commission seriously. And it rightly insists that faith in Christ is not optional. I respect the rigor of this view. The urgency it gives to missions has sent thousands of people across the world to share the gospel. That urgency is real, and this book does not ask anyone to give it up.

But restrictivism also carries a heavy cost. It means that the single most important factor in a person’s eternal destiny is not the condition of their heart. It is the accident of when and where they were born. A person with a soft heart toward God, living in a place the gospel has not reached, is lost. A person in the same village, with the same heart, born a thousand years later after missionaries arrive, is saved. The difference is not moral. It is logistical.59

I cannot accept that conclusion. It means that Mei is condemned for living in the wrong century and the wrong country. It means Anna is condemned for dying as a baby. It means that the accident of geography and history, not the state of the human heart before God, decides who gets a chance and who does not. And it means that God’s stated desire that “all people be saved” failed, not in a few tragic cases, but across the majority of the human race.6

Universal Opportunity Before Death

Some theologians try to preserve both God’s fairness and the necessity of hearing the gospel by arguing that God gets the message to everyone before they die. Perhaps through a dream. Perhaps through an angel. Perhaps through some form of special revelation we have no record of.7

The heart behind this view is right: it insists that God is fair and that no one dies without a real chance. But the claim faces steep problems. Is it really plausible that every person born in pre-Christian China, or in an uncontacted tribe in the Amazon, or in a remote corner of medieval Central Asia received a dream or a vision clearly presenting the gospel of Jesus Christ? Beilby rightly notes that the lack of any evidence for such pervasive supernatural outreach puts a heavy burden of proof on this view.8

And even if we could stretch to cover Mei, what about Anna and Sam? A dream or an angelic visitor does nothing for a six-month-old baby or for a man whose disability means he cannot process language at all.9

Inclusivism

Inclusivists offer a gentler answer. They say that salvation is possible for those who respond in faith to whatever light God gives them, even if they never hear the name of Jesus. God reveals himself through creation (Romans 1:19–20), through conscience (Romans 2:14–15), and perhaps through the stirrings of the Holy Spirit in every human heart. A person who responds to that light with genuine faith and repentance can be saved, even without knowing the theological content of the gospel.10

John Sanders describes inclusivism this way: it is the view that “some of those who never hear the gospel of Christ may nevertheless attain salvation before they die if they respond in faith to the revelation that they do have.”11 The inclusivist points to figures like Melchizedek in the Old Testament and Cornelius in the New. These are people apparently saved apart from (or before receiving) the full gospel message.

There is genuine strength here. Inclusivism takes God’s love seriously. It avoids the stark harshness of restrictivism. And it rightly insists that God is not limited to one delivery method for his grace. The inclusivist appeal to Hebrews 11:6 is worth hearing: “Without faith it is impossible to please God, because anyone who comes to him must believe that he exists and that he rewards those who earnestly seek him.” The inclusivist reads this to mean that what God requires is not a specific set of doctrinal beliefs. It is a heart turned toward him in trust. That is a genuine insight, and it deserves respect.

But I have two concerns, and the second one is a deal-breaker.

The first is that inclusivism lowers the bar on what saving faith actually is. Beilby makes a sharp point: even if we grant that faith is not mainly about theological content but about a “directional vector” toward God, that directional movement is “supremely irrelevant if it does not result in relationship with God.”12 He offers an analogy. A bride-to-be loves her fiancé, is committed to him, and everyone expects her to say “I do.” Does that mean they are married? No. They are married when they pledge themselves to each other. All the proximate steps are important, but none of them are the final, relational act.13 Implicit faith may be real and valuable. But it is not the same thing as knowing and receiving Christ.

The second concern is more pressing. Inclusivism works best for the clearest cases of the unevangelized, people like Mei who lived decent lives and never heard. But it stumbles when it meets the harder cases. What does inclusivism say about Anna? What does it say about Sam? And what does it say about those who heard the gospel, but heard it so badly that calling it “hearing” is almost a cruel joke?14

That last group brings us to a category that changes the whole conversation.

Pluralism and Universalism (Briefly)

Two other answers deserve a mention, though this book does not adopt either.

Pluralism says there are many paths to God and Christianity is just one of them. I cannot go there. The New Testament is too clear that salvation comes through Christ alone (Acts 4:12; John 14:6). This book affirms that truth without apology.15

Universalism says that all will finally be saved. I am open to the hope that this may be true, and I take the best universalist arguments seriously (as Chapter 20 and Chapter 28 will show). But I cannot build the book’s argument on it. Freedom is real, and a real “yes” to God requires a real possibility of “no.” The book’s thesis stands whether or not all are finally saved.16

Three Faces the Answers Must Meet

The real test of any theology is not whether it works in the abstract. It is whether it works when you put a face on it. So let me introduce you to three people. I have given them names, because they deserve names. Each one stands for millions.

Mei

We have already met Mei. She is a third-century woman in inland China. She lived a quiet, decent, moral life. She honored her parents, cared for her neighbors, and tried to do right by the light she had. She died without ever once hearing the name of Jesus Christ. Not because she rejected the gospel. Not because she was too stubborn or too sinful to listen. The gospel simply had not reached her world.17

Mei stands for what Beilby calls the “George” case: the genuinely unevangelized, isolated from the gospel by geography and time.18 There have been billions of Meis across human history. For most of the story of our species, there was no gospel to hear. Even after Christ came, the good news spread slowly and unevenly. Mei did not reject God. She simply never met him in the way the gospel makes possible.

Insight. The difference between Mei and the person sitting in a church pew is not a difference in virtue, character, or moral seriousness. It is a difference in address. She was born on the wrong side of the planet a thousand years too early. That is all.

Anna

Anna is a baby girl. She was born healthy. Her parents loved her. She died at six months, suddenly and without warning. She never spoke a word. She never formed a thought complex enough to count as “belief” or “unbelief.” She never sinned in any conscious, personal way.19

What do we say about Anna?

Christians have tried several answers. The Roman Catholic tradition tied infant salvation to baptism, which left unbaptized infants in a painful theological limbo (literally: limbus infantium). Many Protestants appeal to an “age of accountability,” the idea that children below a certain developmental stage are not held responsible for sin they could not have committed. David’s words after his infant son’s death, “I shall go to him” (2 Samuel 12:23), are often taken as a quiet biblical hint that infants are safe with God.20

Reformed theology offers another path. If God elects people for salvation apart from any human action, then he can elect infants. Some Calvinists go further and say that all who die in infancy are necessarily elect, since God in his providence would not allow a reprobate child to die before reaching the age when their sin becomes conscious and personal.21

I understand the comfort these answers offer. But notice what they all do. They find a way around the problem of the unevangelized by creating a special exception for babies. They set aside the normal requirement of personal faith and say it does not apply here. That is a reasonable instinct. But if personal faith can be set aside for Anna because she could not exercise it, then we have already admitted the principle that matters: it is not fair to condemn someone who never had a real chance to respond.22

And once that principle is admitted, it starts to pull other cases along with it.

Sam

Sam was born with a profound cognitive disability. He lived to be forty-seven. He was gentle, kind in his own way, and deeply loved by his family. But he never developed the mental capacity to understand language in any meaningful sense. He could not grasp the word “sin.” He could not grasp the word “grace.” A gospel presentation would have been no more meaningful to him than it would be to a stone.23

Sam is not Anna. He lived a full lifespan. He is not a baby. The “age of accountability” answer does not fit neatly, because there was no age at which accountability switched on. The gap between Sam and Anna is a reminder that the spectrum of human cognitive ability is wide, and the boundary between “accountable” and “not accountable” is not a bright line.24

Beilby points out that when the problem of the cognitively disabled is discussed at all, it is usually treated as a subset of the infant problem. But it deserves its own attention. The questions Sam raises are different. How does the concept of sin apply to a person who does not reason in categories of power or rebellion? How does the concept of faith apply to a person who cannot hold a proposition in his mind long enough to assent to it? We cannot just wave Sam into heaven by extending the age of accountability to cover him. We need a real account of how the God who loves Sam actually reaches him.25

Note. Mei, Anna, and Sam will each receive their own full chapter later in this book. Chapter 31 develops the unevangelized case. Chapter 29 takes up the infant question with the pastoral care it deserves. Chapter 30 addresses the cognitively disabled. Here, the task is to feel the weight of the problem these three represent together.

The Complication Nobody Expected: The Pseudoevangelized

Mei, Anna, and Sam are the classic cases. But Beilby adds a category that, in my view, is one of the most important contributions in the entire literature on this subject. He calls them the pseudoevangelized: people who technically heard the gospel, but whose “hearing” was so distorted, so damaged, or so cut short that it hardly counts.26

Three cases bring this to life.

Kunta Kinte

Kunta Kinte is the central figure of Alex Haley’s novel Roots. Born in Gambia in 1750, he was kidnapped at seventeen and enslaved in America. His captors told him about their God: a God who, according to them, considered Africans less than human, and who smiled on the enslavement, rape, and torture of Black people by white Christians.27

Kunta rejected this God. Every Christian should agree with that rejection. The “gospel” Kunta heard was not the gospel. It was a moral horror dressed in religious language. As Beilby writes, the picture of God presented to Kunta through general revelation in nature was actually more accurate than the picture his enslavers painted, even though it lacked the details of the gospel.28

Has Kunta “heard the gospel and rejected it”? In the most shallow, technical sense, yes. He heard the name “Jesus.” He heard some claims about Jesus. But the good news of a God who loves all people and gave himself for all people? He never heard that. Not once.29

And Kunta is not alone. His case stands for every indigenous person forced to “convert” at gunpoint. Every enslaved person who heard the gospel only from the lips of the people who held the whip. Every human being across history who heard a version of Christianity so twisted that rejecting it was the morally right thing to do.

Beilby asks the question plainly: “Is it possible to believe that a loving God would take Kunta Kinte’s rejection of the gospel he has heard as the final answer?” The answer, he argues, is clearly no. The God who leaves the ninety-nine sheep to seek the one lost sheep would not call it a day when the lost sheep has been lied to about who the shepherd is.60

Micha

Micha was born in South Korea. Her birth mother gave her up. Her adoptive American parents divorced. She was abused in foster care by her foster father. When she told her foster mother, the woman blamed Micha. In high school, Micha started attending church and found the courage to tell her youth pastor. He abused her too, and used the Bible to justify it.30

Every person who was supposed to love and protect Micha betrayed her. Her ability to trust anyone, let alone an all-powerful God, was shattered. She did not reject God out of rebellion. Her capacity to trust was disabled. The gospel requires more than understanding. It requires trust. And trust is exactly what Micha’s life destroyed.31

Here is a question that should keep us up at night. Is Micha’s failure to trust God wholly her fault? Beilby does not say she is sinless. He says something more precise: “If Micha’s life experiences were different, her response to the gospel might have been different.” And this is simply true. The same woman, raised in a home that loved her and a church that protected her, might have come to faith easily. The capacity for trust is not infinitely elastic. It can be broken. And when it breaks, the person did not choose for it to break.61

Jesus himself spoke to this kind of situation with terrifying directness: “If anyone causes one of these little ones who believe in me to stumble, it would be better for them to have a large millstone hung around their neck and to be drowned in the depths of the sea” (Matthew 18:6, ESV). The people who damaged Micha will answer for that damage. But what about Micha herself? Does the damage they caused become her eternal sentence?

Beilby draws a striking comparison. Sam cannot grasp the gospel because of a cognitive disability he was born with. Micha cannot grasp it because of a trust disability that was inflicted on her. The damage is different, but the result is the same: the person cannot genuinely hear the gospel in the way God intends it to be heard.32

Rapunzel

Rapunzel and her twin sister Gretel were close in every way. They had the same background, the same personality, the same growing interest in the Christian faith. They started attending church together. One evening, they drove separately to a church event. Gretel arrived, gave her life to Christ that night in a genuine and wholehearted way. Rapunzel never arrived. She died in a car crash on the way.33

Rapunzel was on a trajectory toward faith. Everything about her life pointed in that direction. She was not fleeing God. She was moving toward him. But her time ran out before the journey was complete.

Is Rapunzel “unevangelized”? Not exactly. She had heard the gospel and was drawn to it. Is she “evangelized”? Not in the way that matters most. She never made the commitment. The door was opening, and it was slammed shut by an accident on a highway.34

Some will object that Rapunzel could have responded sooner. She could have committed her life to Christ last week, or last month, or the first time she felt the pull. And that is true. But Beilby asks us to sit with a hard question: does anyone really know enough about another person’s inner life to say, with confidence, that they have had an “adequate opportunity”? The honest answer is no. We do not know how long it takes a given person to move from hearing to believing. We do not know what inner battles Rapunzel was fighting. What we know is that God does.62

And that is the point that unites all three of these cases. Kunta’s gospel was poisoned. Micha’s trust was broken. Rapunzel’s time was stolen. In each case, the thing that was missing was not the person’s desire for God. It was the circumstances that would have made a genuine response possible.

Primary Source. Beilby on the pseudoevangelized: “The traditional approach to the theory of Postmortem Opportunity is that the postmortem presentation of the gospel should be limited to the unevangelized. … This seems incorrect. If one was only interested in answering the question, ‘How can God be considered to be just?’ then maybe one might be able to justify not providing a Postmortem Opportunity to the pseudoevangelized. … But operating on the assumption that it is possible that some of the pseudoevangelized would respond to the gospel if given the opportunity, is there any doubt that a God who desired all to be saved would not want to give [them] an opportunity to hear and respond?”

— James K. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 66

Beilby is right. The category of the pseudoevangelized blows the neat line between “heard” and “not heard” wide open. As he notes, the question of who has and who has not genuinely heard the gospel is “more complex than has been acknowledged.”35 And once we see that complexity, the old formula “they heard, so they are accountable” collapses. It turns hearing into a bare auditory event and strips away everything that makes it a genuine encounter with God.

The Vagueness Problem: Where God Draws the Line

There is a deeper problem lurking beneath all these cases. Beilby calls it, borrowing from the philosopher Theodore Sider, the Vagueness Problem.36

The logic is simple. Most Christians believe there are only two final states: heaven and hell. They believe heaven is very, very good and hell is very, very bad. They believe God decides who goes where. And they believe that decision is based on the person’s response to God.

But human responses to God come in degrees. People are not neatly divided into “one hundred percent Christians” and “one hundred percent non-Christians.” C. S. Lewis said it well: there are people slowly becoming Christians who do not call themselves by that name, and people slowly ceasing to be Christians who still do.37

Now apply that to the unevangelized. If Mei had been born in the Roman Empire and heard the gospel, she might have responded. If the person sitting in a church pew next to you had been born in third-century inland China, they would not have had saving faith either. The difference between the two is not a difference in character or in openness to God. It is a difference in zip code and birth year.38

And yet, on the standard accounts, these two nearly identical people end up in radically different eternal states. That tension, Beilby argues, conflicts with God’s love, goodness, and justice. If two people are nearly the same in terms of faith and virtue, it is hard to see how a good God would assign them vastly unequal outcomes based on accidents of geography and history.39

Common Objection. “We must simply trust God. He will do what is right.” That is true. I believe it completely. But notice that this answer tells us nothing about how God does what is right. Trusting God is not the same as having no idea what to trust him for. The question this book asks is: what does it actually look like when the God we trust reaches the people who never heard? Postmortem opportunity is not a replacement for trust in God. It is a picture of what the God we trust actually does.

Why the Usual Answers Strain Under These Cases

Let me pull together what we have seen. The standard answers all have something right. Restrictivism is right that faith in Christ is necessary. Inclusivism is right that God is not limited in how he distributes grace. The age of accountability is right that it would be unjust to condemn a baby for sins the baby could not commit.

But none of them, on their own, can carry the full weight of Mei, Anna, Sam, Kunta, Micha, and Rapunzel all at once.

Restrictivism cannot help Mei or Anna or Sam, because none of them ever had a chance to hear.

Inclusivism works tolerably for Mei, who might have responded to the light of creation. But it has nothing to say about Anna or Sam, who could not respond to anything. And it struggles badly with Kunta and Micha, because their ability to respond was destroyed by the very people who were supposed to bring them the good news.40

The age of accountability covers Anna, and perhaps Sam. But it does not cover Mei or Kunta or Micha or Rapunzel, all of whom are adults with functioning minds. And even where it works, it works by creating an exception to the requirement of personal faith, which raises the question: if God makes exceptions for babies, why would he not make a stronger provision for the billions of adults who are in the same functional position?

And the universal-opportunity-before-death view asks us to believe something for which there is no evidence: that God secretly delivered the gospel to every person on the planet through dreams and visions, including babies and the profoundly disabled, without leaving a trace.41

One more option deserves a mention. Some appeal to God’s middle knowledge: God knows what every person would have done if they had heard the gospel, and he judges them on that basis. This is a clever answer, and it draws on real theological resources (we will meet middle knowledge in depth in Chapter 23). But even Beilby, who takes middle knowledge seriously, sees a problem. If God can give the unevangelized an actual opportunity to hear and respond, why would he settle for judging them based on what they would have done in a situation that never happened? A real response is better than a hypothetical one. A person who stands in actual relationship with God is in a different position from a person who would have, in some other possible world, chosen to stand there.68

The analogy Beilby uses is pointed. Suppose someone offered you the Congressional Medal of Honor, not because you served in the military, but because God knows that if you had served and had been placed in a certain dangerous situation, you would have acted heroically. Would you feel you had earned it? Would you wear it with pride? The answer, Beilby suggests, is no. And the same logic applies to salvation. It is “far better that a person’s final destination be decided by a decision that they consciously and explicitly make, not by decisions that they would have made.”69

Stephen Jonathan captures the frustration a pastor feels standing in front of a grieving family. The universal-opportunity view does not help a widow who knows perfectly well that her husband did not turn to Christ before death. Middle knowledge does not comfort her, because apart from the difficulty of explaining it at a bedside, it offers no assurance that her husband would have responded. Inclusivism offers little hope if the husband had heard the gospel and shown no interest. Restrictivism asks the widow to accept that her husband is lost.42

There is a better answer. And it starts with the character of the God we have been studying in Chapter 2 and the cross we unpacked in Chapter 3.

A Different Direction: The Offer After Death

Beilby points us toward the answer. There is a view that takes the best insights from each of the positions above and avoids their weaknesses. From restrictivism, it keeps the truth that salvation requires conscious, personal faith in Jesus Christ. From inclusivism, it keeps the truth that God makes salvation genuinely available to all. And it resolves the tension between the two by denying the assumption that holds them apart: the assumption that death is the end of the chance to hear and respond.43

This view is called postmortem opportunity.

The logic is straightforward. If God desires all to be saved (and he does: Chapter 2). If Christ died for all (and he did: Chapter 3). If some die without a genuine chance to hear and respond (and they do: this chapter). Then either God’s desire is frustrated on a vast scale, or the opportunity continues past death.

Beilby’s argument turns on the transitivity of desire. If God desires that all have a chance to be saved, and if the only way for some to have that chance is a postmortem opportunity, then God desires to give a postmortem opportunity. To deny this, Beilby argues, is to deny that God truly desires the salvation of all. And that cuts against the whole weight of Scripture we surveyed in Chapter 2.44

But isn’t this just a “second chance”? That is the question I hear most often when I lay out this view. It deserves a clear answer.

For the unevangelized, the answer is simple: no. It is not a second chance, because there was no first chance. Mei never heard the gospel. You cannot get a “second” opportunity for something you never had a first opportunity for. The same applies to Anna, Sam, and to most of the pseudoevangelized. Beilby puts it this way: the claim that Romans 1 gives everyone a “first chance” through general revelation confuses knowing that God exists with having a genuine opportunity to be saved. Even the demons know that God exists (James 2:19). That is not a salvific opportunity.63

For someone like Rapunzel, the question is harder, because she had heard something. But Beilby argues convincingly that the label “second chance” assumes more knowledge about what counts as an adequate opportunity than any of us actually has. What matters, Beilby writes, “is not our opinion about what is or is not adequate, but whether God himself considers [the] opportunity to be sufficient.”64

The full treatment of the “second chance” objection belongs to Chapter 19 and Chapter 32, so I will not develop it further here. For now, the key point is this: the offer after death is not a second chance. It is the continuation of one pursuit, by one God, who does not stop loving at the grave.

Jonathan’s work arrives at a similar place from a pastoral direction. He walks a “both/and” pathway between inclusivism and postmortem opportunity, arguing that God would use all means at his disposal to reach the lost. An all-wise, all-loving God, Jonathan contends, “would not need to limit himself to such humanly defined and narrow constructs as inclusivism or posthumous salvation” when both can work together.45

I find Jonathan’s instinct exactly right. And I want to push it one step further.

Further Than Beilby Goes

Here is where this book parts ways with Beilby, gently and with deep respect for his work.

Beilby builds his case for postmortem opportunity around the unevangelized and pseudoevangelized. That is, people who never had a genuine chance to hear the gospel in this life. His argument is compelling. But he limits the postmortem offer to those groups. If you heard the gospel clearly, understood it, and rejected it, Beilby does not extend a postmortem opportunity to you.46

I understand his caution. But I think the logic of his own argument carries further than he lets it go.

The driving force behind Beilby’s case is not the accident of who heard or who did not hear. It is the character of God. It is the love of a God who desires all to be saved, who gave his Son for all, and who is not content with a bare minimum. If that God pursues Mei because she never heard, why would he not pursue the person who heard a muddled version, or the person who heard clearly at twenty but was so wounded by life at sixty that the faith of their youth felt like a foreign language? The deciding factor is not the accident of whether a person once heard a sermon. It is the heart of God revealed in Christ.

This book extends the offer to all the unsaved. Every person who dies without saving faith in Christ receives a genuine, personal, fully informed, fully free offer. At the deathbed. Through the conscious intermediate state. And finally, at the Great White Throne judgment. The full mechanism is laid out in the chapters to come, and the synthesis is developed in Chapter 23.

Key Argument. The chapter’s distinctive move: this book does not limit the postmortem offer to the unevangelized and pseudoevangelized. It extends it to all the unsaved, because the driving factor is God’s character, not the historical accident of who happened to hear a sermon. The offer is an expression of who God is, not a remedial patch for logistical failures in the history of missions.

I state my disagreement with Beilby openly and with gratitude. His work made my argument possible. Without his careful framing of the problem, his taxonomy, his test cases, and his theological logic, I could not have written this chapter or this book. I simply think his own best arguments carry further than he allows them to go.47

Not Just a Chance, but the Best Possible Chance

There is one more piece to lay in place before we leave this chapter. It is not enough to say that God gives the unevangelized a chance. The question is what kind of chance.

Jerry Walls puts this with a clarity that has shaped my whole approach. Walls argues that God does not merely give everyone some minimal opportunity and call it fair. He gives what Walls calls optimal grace. This grace, Walls writes, “is deeply personal and individual in the sense that God knows how best to elicit a positive response from each person, without destroying or overriding their freedom. What would be highly effective in converting one person might make another more resistant.”48

Read that again slowly. God does not use a one-size-fits-all pitch. He knows each heart. He knows what would reach Mei and what would reach Kunta and what would reach Micha. And he composes his appeal to each of them accordingly.

Walls presses the point further. Optimal grace “implies that God is not content with merely giving everyone some chance for salvation, but desires to give everyone every opportunity.” God “does not extend the offer of grace merely in a cursory fashion so that everyone has some minimal chance, in order to establish God’s justice in damning them if they reject it.”49

I want you to feel the force of that contrast. There is a world of difference between a God who gives just enough grace to justify condemning you and a God who gives the very best grace possible because he actually wants you home.

Walls pushes even further. Under optimal grace, he writes, “damnation only results from the persistent choice to reject optimal grace.”65 Read that carefully. The person who is finally lost is not someone who never had a real chance. It is someone who had the very best chance God could give, personally designed, lovingly offered, and they still said no. That is a very different picture from one in which Mei is lost because the missionaries took the wrong road.

Walls also makes a point that will matter deeply when we reach the special cases. Under optimal grace, infants and the cognitively disabled are not exceptions to the system. They are not given a free pass because we feel sorry for them. They are given the same quality of grace everyone else gets: the best God has. Walls writes that under optimal grace, infants “will have neither a better nor a worse opportunity to be saved than anyone else.”66 That is a harder claim than the sentimental one. It says: every person, including the baby, meets God’s best. And it trusts God’s best to be genuinely good enough.

The full development of optimal grace comes in Chapter 23, where it meets middle knowledge and the threefold offer. Here, the point is simpler. The question for the unevangelized is not whether they get a chance. The question is whether they get God’s best. Under optimal grace, the answer is yes.

Beilby draws this contrast even more sharply, using Terrance Tiessen’s language. Tiessen speaks of God providing “sufficient grace.” Beilby asks the obvious question: sufficient for what? And Tiessen’s answer is revealing. The sufficiency of God’s grace, Tiessen writes, “lies particularly in its being enough to justify God’s condemnation” of sinners.50

Beilby’s response is devastating and right. Grace defined as “enough to justify condemnation” is self-defeating. He offers an analogy: if a teacher only teaches well enough to avoid complaints when students fail, that teaching is not sufficient as teaching. Teaching exists to help students learn. Grace exists to save. A grace calibrated to justify damnation is not grace at all.51

Insight. A perfect lover does not use one generic pitch on everyone. He knows each heart and composes his appeal accordingly. Optimal grace means that the offer after death is not a bare minimum. It is God’s very best, personally fitted to the soul receiving it.

How the Special Cases Are Reached

But wait. Even if we grant postmortem opportunity, even if we grant optimal grace, what about Anna? She is a baby. She has no mental framework for a “gospel presentation,” no matter how lovingly tailored. And what about Sam? He cannot process language at all.

This is where the book’s picture of the encounter matters. And I want to preview it here, briefly, before the full treatment comes in Chapters 2931.

The key is the soul. This book affirms, and will argue at length in Chapters 67, that human beings are more than their bodies. You are a soul joined to a body. When the body dies, the soul survives. And when the soul is freed from the limitations of the body, it is freed from the limitations the body imposed.

Anna is not “still a baby” in the encounter. She is a soul, given whatever maturity and understanding a genuine choice requires. Sam is not still bound by the impaired brain that limited his earthly life. He is a soul, whole and capable, meeting Christ for the first time with the full capacity to understand what is being offered.52

This is not as speculative as it may sound. There are precedents in the literature. J. Oliver Buswell proposed what Beilby describes as a “postvita” version: just before death, all infants who are about to die are given full adult consciousness and cognitive ability, allowing them to make a genuine decision.53 The theologian Olin Curtis suggested that infants and others who lacked the opportunity in this life will achieve maturity in the intermediate state and be presented the gospel when they are able to understand it.54

Walls interacts with both proposals. He finds Curtis’s postmortem-maturation idea more plausible than Buswell’s at-the-moment-of-death version, though he notes that Curtis is forced into some implausible claims to avoid saying the word “postmortem.” Walls also engages the Reformed theologian Terrance Tiessen, who insists that even infants who are saved make a response of faith before they die. Tiessen appeals to mind-body dualism to argue that an infant’s “personal ability” outstrips physical ability, so even a baby might respond to God in some preverbal spiritual way. Walls finds this a stretch. The development of the mind does not outstrip the development of the brain in the way Tiessen seems to assume.55

What matters for our purposes is the common ground all of these proposals share. Each one assumes that the God who loves Anna and Sam will not leave them trapped in limitations that are not their fault. Each one assumes that a genuine encounter requires genuine capacity. And each one assumes that God can and does provide that capacity.

This book takes the simplest path through that common ground. In the encounter, the soul is given whatever it needs to make a free and fully informed choice. The baby is not still a baby. The disabled person is not still disabled. And the person who never heard the gospel in life hears it clearly for the first time, in the full, personal, loving presence of Christ himself.

That is the mechanism. The details are developed in the chapters that follow.

What This Book Does Not Claim

Before we close, let me set the fences clearly.

This book does not claim that everyone is saved. Freedom is real. A genuine “yes” to God requires a genuine “no” as a live option. Some may refuse, even when faced with Christ in his fullness. Chapter 22 takes that possibility seriously, and Chapter 24 states honestly what this book leaves open.56

This book does not claim that death is unimportant. What you do in this life matters profoundly. But the door does not slam shut when the heart stops. It slams shut at the end of the final judgment. That is the one true deadline, and Chapter 19 will make the case from Scripture.57

This book does not claim that evangelism and missions no longer matter. They matter more, not less. If God pursues every soul with his best, then the church that proclaims the gospel is joining God in a work he will never stop doing. The person who hears the gospel in this life and believes has a head start on a journey that everyone else has to begin later, under harder conditions. Proclaim the gospel now, because it is better for a person to know Christ sooner than later. Chapter 32 addresses this objection head-on.

And this book does not claim that salvation comes through any road other than Christ. Mei will not be saved by sincerity. Anna will not be saved by innocence. Sam will not be saved by moral blamelessness. They will be saved, if they are saved, by a personal encounter with the risen Jesus, who gives himself to each of them as clearly and as lovingly as he gives himself to anyone who hears a sermon in a church. Chapter 12 will explain why it must be Jesus, and no one else.58

From the Cross to the Pursuit

Here is where the first four chapters of this book come together.

Chapter 2 showed us a God who desires all to be saved and who takes no pleasure in the death of the wicked. Chapter 3 showed us a cross that is genuinely for all. This chapter has shown us a world in which billions of people, through no fault of their own, never once had a chance to receive what that cross offers.

The conclusion writes itself. Because Christ died for all, because God desires all to be saved, and because many never had a real chance in this life, the offer must reach them somewhere. And it does. At the deathbed, where the dying meet a love most of them never clearly saw in life. Through the conscious intermediate state, where the God who holds the keys of death and Hades keeps drawing the soul he will not abandon. And at the final judgment, where every remaining person stands in the full, unveiled presence of the love they have been offered all along.

The mechanism is coming. The evidence for the soul that survives is coming (Chapters 510). The threshold encounter is coming (Chapters 1113). The biblical foundations are coming (Chapters 1419). The full synthesis, where optimal grace meets middle knowledge and the threefold offer, is coming in Chapter 23.

But the foundation is now in place. We know who God is. We know what the cross covers. And we know the size of the problem that demands an answer.

The answer is not that God gave up on Mei. It is not that he assigned Anna to a theological exception and moved on. It is not that he looked at Sam and shrugged. It is not that he accepted Kunta’s rejection of a gospel Kunta never actually heard. It is not that he blamed Micha for the trust her abusers stole.

The answer is that the God who gave everything on the cross does not stop giving when the heart stops beating.

Nigel Wright, in his foreword to Jonathan’s Grace beyond the Grave, puts the question with the precision it deserves. We are all still in via, he writes: still on the way. “The final judgment has yet to take place, there is still time.” And then, the key move: “Although human beings may be bounded by death, God is not. … In Christ God has made known his sovereignty over death.”67

Why should death, of all things, be a boundary the God of the resurrection cannot cross?

He keeps coming. He comes to all of them. That is who he is.

Notes

1. The Population Reference Bureau’s widely cited estimate puts the total at approximately 108 billion humans born since the emergence of Homo sapiens. See Carl Haub, “How Many People Have Ever Lived on Earth?” Population Reference Bureau, updated 2022.

2. Historical demographers estimate under-five mortality rates between 30 and 50 percent for much of recorded history. See James C. Riley, Rising Life Expectancy: A Global History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), ch. 1.

3. James K. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity: A Biblical, Theological, and Philosophical Argument (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2021), 23.

4. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 22–23. Beilby notes that the three statements, taken in pairs, are perfectly compatible. It is only when all three are conjoined that the tension arises. Each traditional view resolves the tension by denying (or softening) one of the three.

5. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 23–24. Restrictivists appeal to Romans 10:14, 17 and to the necessity of preaching and hearing for saving faith.

6. Beilby distinguishes restrictivism from exclusivism. Exclusivism affirms that salvation is possible only through Christ’s atonement (a claim this book fully shares). Restrictivism is the narrower claim that access to salvation is restricted to those who hear and respond to the gospel. See Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 23.

7. This is what Beilby classifies as “Universal Opportunity.” Some versions appeal to dreams, angelic visitations, or direct divine encounters before death. See Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 28–30.

8. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 95–96. He notes the “prima facie implausibility” of the claim that all who lived before Christ or outside the influence of Israel received special revelation through visions or angelic messengers.

9. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 95–96. The pseudoevangelized cases pose an even sharper problem: would a dream or angelic visitation overcome Kunta Kinte’s justified rejection? Would it cure Micha’s inability to trust?

10. For a representative survey of inclusivist arguments, see Clark H. Pinnock, A Wideness in God’s Mercy: The Finality of Jesus Christ in a World of Religions (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1992); John Sanders, No Other Name: An Investigation into the Destiny of the Unevangelized (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1992); and Amos Yong, Beyond the Impasse: Toward a Pneumatological Theology of Religions (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2003).

11. John Sanders, as quoted in Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 244.

12. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 265.

13. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 265. The engagement analogy is Beilby’s own: the proximate steps toward marriage are important, but none of them is the final relational commitment. So too with implicit versus explicit faith.

14. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 265–266. Inclusivism “thrives when discussing the most obvious examples of the unevangelized, our ‘George’ cases.” But it “has little to say” about Anna and Sam cases that would differ from a restrictivist, and it “struggles to explain how the pseudoevangelized… might have an opportunity to be saved.”

15. See Acts 4:12: “There is salvation in no one else, for there is no other name under heaven given among men by which we must be saved” (ESV). See also John 14:6. The Christ-centered core of this book is developed in Chapter 12.

16. The relationship between postmortem opportunity and universalism is explored in Chapter 28. The author’s working eschatological position (conditional immortality, open to universal restoration, rejecting eternal conscious torment) is stated in Chapter 24.

17. Mei is this book’s renaming of Beilby’s “George” case: a person who lived and died without any access to the gospel due to geographic and temporal isolation. See Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 8–9.

18. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 8–9.

19. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 5–6. The “Anna” case is Beilby’s designation for infants who die before the capacity for faith develops.

20. On the use of 2 Samuel 12:23 in the infant-salvation debate, see Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 6; and the discussion in Chapter 29 of this volume, which owns the exegesis of this passage.

21. For the Reformed position that all who die in infancy are elect, and the claim that God would not allow a reprobate infant to die before conscious sin, see Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 8–9. Beilby cites Millard Erickson: “Infants are savable because they are electable and they are electable because election is the work of God, not of human beings.”

22. This is the principle of fairness that runs through the entire unevangelized debate: if it is unjust to condemn someone who never had a genuine opportunity, then providing that opportunity is a requirement of divine justice. The question then becomes when and how the opportunity is given.

23. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 9–10. The “Sam” case represents those with cognitive disabilities so profound that comprehension of the gospel is beyond their capacity.

24. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 9–10. The range of cognitive disabilities is vast. Some disabilities are so severe as to “utterly rule out any possibility of grasping the gospel in any way.” Others leave partial capacity. The boundary is not a bright line.

25. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 10. Beilby notes that our “typical ways of describing sin and salvation probably have to be at least complicated and perhaps reimagined” to address the situation of those with profound cognitive disabilities.

26. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 11–15. Beilby considers three labels (pseudoevangelized, quasievangelized, semievangelized) and settles on pseudoevangelized, acknowledging the term is imperfect.

27. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 11–12. The Kunta Kinte case is adapted from Alex Haley’s Roots.

28. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 66–67.

29. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 11–12. Kunta “heard the name ‘Jesus’… but the gospel that he has heard is certainly not good news.”

30. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 12–13.

31. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 67–68. Beilby notes the counterfactual: “if Micha’s life experiences were different, her response to the gospel might have been different.”

32. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 67. The comparison between Sam’s cognitive disability and Micha’s trust disability is Beilby’s own.

33. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 13–14.

34. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 13–14. Beilby observes that it is “highly plausible that Rapunzel would have followed a path similar to Gretel” had she survived. Her trajectory was interrupted by an accident, not by a decision.

35. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 14–15.

36. Theodore Sider, as adapted by Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 99–101.

37. C. S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (New York: HarperOne, 2001), 176. Lewis’s observation is cited in Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 99.

38. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 100. “The differences between the two people concern their geographical and temporal location, not differences in virtue, disposition toward faith, or any other morally significant property.”

39. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 100.

40. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 265–266. “Far more difficult for General Revelation Inclusivists is the case of Kunta Kinte… An Inclusivist who sees some salvific value in other religions might claim that Kunta’s commitment to Islam could be indicative of implicit faith, but it is a stretch.”

41. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 95–96.

42. Stephen Jonathan, Grace beyond the Grave: Is Salvation Possible in the Afterlife? (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2014), 3–4. Jonathan writes as a pastor who has faced these situations at bedsides and funerals.

43. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 32–33. Beilby frames postmortem opportunity as the view that takes the best insights of restrictivism (faith is necessary), inclusivism (God’s love is universal), and universal opportunity (everyone gets a chance), while denying the assumption that death is the end of salvific opportunity.

44. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 98–99.

45. Jonathan, Grace beyond the Grave, 184. Jonathan argues for a “both/and rather than an either/or approach” between inclusivism and postmortem opportunity, since God would “use all means and methods available to bring about his salvific purposes.”

46. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 55–56, 66. Beilby’s postmortem opportunity is explicitly targeted at those who did not receive a genuine premortem opportunity. He does not extend it to all the unsaved without qualification.

47. My disagreement with Beilby is substantive but limited. We agree on the theology of God’s character, the universal scope of the atonement, the necessity of faith in Christ, and the theological coherence of postmortem opportunity. We disagree on how far the offer reaches. I believe the logic that drives his argument, when applied consistently, extends the offer to all the unsaved, not only to the unevangelized and pseudoevangelized.

48. Jerry L. Walls, Purgatory: The Logic of Total Transformation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), ch. 5.

49. Walls, Purgatory, ch. 5.

50. Terrance L. Tiessen, as cited in Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 44–45.

51. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 45. “If I only teach well enough to sidestep my students’ complaints when I fail them, my teaching is insufficient as teaching.”

52. The substance-dualism case is developed at length in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. The claim that the soul freed from the body is freed from the body’s limitations is a standard implication of substance dualism in the Christian tradition.

53. J. Oliver Buswell, as described in Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 55.

54. Olin Alfred Curtis, The Christian Faith (New York: Eaton and Mains, 1905), as discussed in Walls, Purgatory, ch. 5. Curtis proposes that those who lacked a full probation in this life will achieve maturity in the intermediate state.

55. Walls, Purgatory, ch. 5. Walls notes that Tiessen is “forced to rely on highly speculative assumptions to avoid postmortem conversion,” and that the notion that the mind’s development outstrips the brain’s in infancy is “much more dubious” than standard mind-body dualism warrants.

56. The rationality of refusal and the reality of freedom are treated in Chapter 22; the author’s working eschatological view is stated in Chapter 24.

57. The case that the final judgment, not the moment of death, is the true deadline is developed in Chapter 19.

58. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 279. Beilby is clear that postmortem opportunity “accepts that not all accept Christ in this life” and that “salvific opportunity ends at the day of judgment. After judgment has been passed, it is final.”

59. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 100. The vagueness problem makes this explicit: the differences between the saved and the lost in these cases “concern their geographical and temporal location, not differences in virtue, disposition toward faith, or any other morally significant property.”

60. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 66–67. “It is very difficult to claim that a loving God would take Kunta Kinte’s rejection of the gospel he has heard as the final answer.”

61. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 67. Beilby connects Micha’s case to the counterfactual: her experiences “have made it impossible for her to truly hear the gospel in the way that God would desire.”

62. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 220–221. The determining factor, Beilby argues, “is not our opinion about what is or is not adequate, but whether God himself considers [the person’s] opportunity to be sufficient.”

63. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 219–220. “Knowing that God exists and, by virtue of that knowledge, not being able to say to God, ‘I didn’t know you existed’ is very different than having a genuine opportunity to be saved, hearing the gospel, and embracing a relationship with Jesus Christ.”

64. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 220–221.

65. Walls, Purgatory, ch. 5.

66. Walls, Purgatory, ch. 5. Walls is making a principled point against sentimentalism: the assumption that all infants are automatically saved “has little to be said for it, beyond its sentimental appeal.” Under optimal grace, all persons, infants included, receive God’s best opportunity.

67. Nigel G. Wright, foreword to Stephen Jonathan, Grace beyond the Grave (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2014), vii–viii.

68. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 93–94. Beilby takes middle knowledge seriously but argues that a real postmortem opportunity is superior to judgment based on counterfactual knowledge alone, because it is “surely a better understanding of salvation for them to find themselves in eternal relationship with God because of their specific choice to embrace that relationship.”

69. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 94.