Chapter 22
Matthew 26:24; Mark 14:21; John 17:12
Of one man, Jesus said it would have been better if he had never been born. Stop and let that sink in. If that is the final truth about Judas Iscariot, then for at least one person, God's whole project was a loss. The Creator made a human being whose existence will never, at any point in eternity, be worth the cost. Few sentences press harder on the larger hope than that one.
I want to be honest from the start. This is a hard text. I do not think it proves what the traditional reading says it proves. But I also do not think I can wave it away. The saying over Judas sits in Scripture, spoken by Jesus Himself, and any defense of the larger hope that does not face it squarely has not earned the reader's trust.
The challenge comes in two parts. First, Jesus says of His betrayer: "It would have been better for that man if he had not been born" (Matthew 26:24). On the traditional reading, this can only be true if Judas faces endless ruin. A period of suffering followed by eternal joy would still make existence a net gain. Only a loss that never ends could make non-existence "better."1
Second, Jesus calls Judas "the son of destruction" in John 17:12. The Greek is ho huios tēs apōleias, meaning "the one marked by ruin." He is the one the Father gave who was not kept. He seems to be the single exception to the promise that the Son would "lose nothing" (John 6:39).2
James De Young, in his chapter on texts used to support universalism, presses this case pointedly.
De Young on Judas
"Yet universalism disagrees with Jesus' assessment. It asserts that Judas will be in heaven after some 'corrective suffering' in hell. But Jesus said that, in light of his future, he should never have been born. ... If God respected or allowed Judas' choice then to do such evil, why should we think that God will not respect the results of that choice? ... But if Judas is one person who will be in hell forever, then the whole structure of universalism falls, since it claims that all in hell must come out of it because of God's love."
James B. De Young, Exposing Universalism, ch. 11, "The Appeal to Other Texts That Supposedly Support Universalism"That is a serious argument, and I want to take it seriously. De Young sees Judas as the test case. If even one person is finally lost, the entire universalist claim collapses. So let us look at what Jesus actually said, and what the words mean in their setting.
The saying appears twice in the Gospels, in Matthew and Mark, both at the Last Supper.
"The Son of Man goes as it is written of him, but woe to that man by whom the Son of Man is betrayed! It would have been better for that man if he had not been born." (Matthew 26:24, ESV)
"For the Son of Man goes as it is written of him, but woe to that man by whom the Son of Man is betrayed! It would have been better for that man if he had not been born." (Mark 14:21, ESV)
Notice the structure. Jesus holds two things together in a single sentence. On one side stands the divine plan: "The Son of Man goes as it is written of him." The cross is no accident. On the other side stands human guilt: "Woe to that man by whom the Son of Man is betrayed!" Both are real. God's purpose and Judas's choice stand together, and neither cancels the other.3
De Young himself notes this double framing. He writes that the betrayal "is reckoned in light of both divine sovereignty and planning, and also human accountability."4 I agree completely. Jesus is not speaking in a vacuum. He is speaking at a Passover meal, on the night He will be handed over to die. The horror of the betrayal is real. The guilt is real. The woe is real.
The second text is John 17:12, from Jesus' high priestly prayer:
"While I was with them, I kept them in your name, which you have given me. I have guarded them, and not one of them has been lost except the son of destruction, that the Scripture might be fulfilled." (John 17:12, ESV)
Here Jesus reports to the Father. He has kept every one the Father gave Him. None has been lost. But there is an exception clause: "except the son of destruction." The Greek is ho huios tēs apōleias. The word for "destruction" or "ruin" is apōleia. And the "son of" construction is a Hebrew idiom. It means "one who is characterized by" or "one who belongs to" something.5
Two key words need attention. The word "lost" (Greek apōleto, from apollumi, "to destroy, lose, or perish") appears also in John 6:39. There Jesus says the Father's will is that He should "lose nothing" of all that has been given to Him. The fuller study of this word family belongs to Chapter 27.
And the phrase "son of destruction" (huios tēs apōleias) appears in only one other place in the New Testament. That place is 2 Thessalonians 2:3, where Paul applies it to "the man of lawlessness."6
So the texts put two things before us. A woe saying that seems to call existence itself a net loss for one man. And a title, "son of destruction," that seems to mark him as finally and irreversibly ruined. We need to ask whether either of these carries the weight the traditional reading places on it.
Before we move to the heart of the case, several things deserve notice. First, the Judas story does not end with the woe saying. Matthew 27:3–5 tells us that Judas "changed his mind" (Greek metamelomai, "to feel regret"). He returned the thirty pieces of silver to the chief priests. He confessed, "I have sinned by betraying innocent blood." And then he hanged himself. This is not the picture of a man hardened beyond all feeling. It is the picture of a man crushed by what he has done. Karl Barth commented plainly on this passage: "There is no reason not to take seriously this repentance, this confession, this attempt of Judas to make restitution."23 And Allison and Davies note that the word Matthew uses here, metamelētheis ("having changed his mind"), may indicate genuine repentance given its positive usage elsewhere in Matthew's Gospel (21:29, 32).23b I mention this not to resolve the question but to complicate the portrait. Judas was not a cartoon villain. He was a broken man who saw what he had done and could not bear it.
Second, there is a grammatical question about the saying itself that is easily missed in English. Matthew Hronich observes that the Greek could also be rendered so that the saying refers not to Judas but to Christ: "It would be good for Him [the Son of Man] if that man [Judas] had not been born." The nineteenth-century scholar F. W. Farrar supported this rendering, and it appears in the Wycliffe Translation, Young's Literal Translation, and the Douay-Rheims Version, among others.23c On this reading, Jesus is expressing His own grief over the suffering that will come upon Him through the betrayal. In the Garden of Gethsemane, He prays that the cup of suffering would pass from Him (Matthew 26:39). This may not be the strongest reading, but it is a legitimate one, and it removes the saying entirely from the question of Judas's eternal fate.
Third, Luke's version of the same scene is worth noting. Luke 22:22 records, "For the Son of Man goes as it has been determined, but woe to that man by whom he is betrayed!" The "better never to have been born" phrase does not appear in Luke at all.23d The woe is present, and the gravity is real, but the specific saying that carries the weight of the traditional argument is absent from Luke's telling. This does not prove the saying is unimportant. But it suggests that the early church did not treat it as the decisive word on Judas's eternal destiny.
Start with the saying itself. "It would have been better for that man if he had not been born." Is this a calm, calculated statement about Judas's eternal net worth? Or is it the language of prophetic woe, spoken in the face of a terrible deed?
The answer matters, because this kind of language was not new when Jesus used it. The Old Testament is full of it. Job cries out, "Let the day perish on which I was born" (Job 3:3). Jeremiah says, "Cursed be the day on which I was born!" (Jeremiah 20:14). The Preacher in Ecclesiastes says of the oppressed, "I thought the dead who are already dead more fortunate than the living" (Ecclesiastes 4:2).7
None of these speakers is making a metaphysical claim about the eternal balance sheet of existence. Job is not saying that his life, measured across all time and eternity, will never produce a net good. He is saying that his suffering right now is so terrible that he wishes he had never entered the world to face it. This is the language of grief and horror, not of accounting.8
There is another angle here that deserves notice. George Hurd points out that Jesus does not say it would have been better for Judas never to have existed. He says it would have been better for Judas not to have been born. There is a difference. The word "born" (Greek gennao) refers to the event of birth, not to the act of creation or the beginning of existence. Ecclesiastes 6:3 uses the same logic: "If a man begets a hundred children and lives many years ... but his soul is not satisfied with goodness, or indeed he has no burial, I say that a stillborn child is better than he." A stillborn child was conceived. That child existed. But the child did not live to face the consequences of a broken world. Hurd argues that when Jesus says it would have been better for Judas not to have been born, He is using this same logic. It would have been better for Judas to have died before birth than to have lived and betrayed the Son of God.8b
Kirk MacGregor strengthens this reading with a careful linguistic point. He argues that Jesus is using the first-century Jewish device of metalepsis. That is, Jesus is alluding to earlier Scripture in a way that calls up the full setting of the earlier text. The two passages in view are Jeremiah 20:14–18 and Job 3:16. In Jeremiah, the prophet's notion of "better not to have been born" is not non-existence. It is existing and then dying in the womb. In Job, the same idea appears: "Why was I not buried like a stillborn child, like an infant that never sees the light?" (Job 3:16). In both cases, "not born" means dying before birth, not never having existed at all. MacGregor concludes that the point of Jesus' remark to Judas is that it would have been better if Judas had died before birth than to grow up and betray Jesus.8c
Gerry Beauchemin makes the same distinction in plainer terms. He notes that the passage does not say it would have been better for Judas if his mother had never conceived him. It says only that he should not have been born. The difference matters. It shifts the saying from a claim about the value of Judas's total existence to a cry of woe over what his life became after birth.8d
The Language of Woe
When Job cursed the day of his birth, no one reads that as a literal claim that his total existence would be a net loss forever. It is the cry of a man in agony. When Jesus says it would have been better for Judas not to have been born, we should ask whether the same idiom is at work. Notice, too, the precise wording. Jesus does not say it would have been better for Judas never to have existed. He says it would have been better for him not to have been born. In the Old Testament parallels, "not born" means dying before birth, not non-existence (see Ecclesiastes 6:3; Jeremiah 20:14–18; Job 3:16). The saying expresses horror over a terrible act and its terrible consequences. The parallels suggest it is not a final verdict on the man's eternal destiny.
I believe this is the right way to read it. Jesus is speaking at the Last Supper. The betrayal is about to happen. The cross is hours away. He is pronouncing a prophetic woe over the man who will hand Him over. The saying expresses the dreadful gravity of what Judas is about to do, and the dreadful consequences that will follow from it. It is not a metaphysical audit of whether Judas's existence will, across infinite time, produce a surplus of joy or suffering.9
This does not make the saying less serious. The woe is real. The consequences are real. What it does is open a question. Must "better never to have been born" mean "Judas will suffer forever"? Or does it mean something closer to this: "What Judas is about to do, and what it will cost him, is so terrible that the language of woe is the only right response"? I believe it is the latter.10
Thomas Talbott raises a point that I think the traditionalist should weigh carefully. Suppose we do press the saying as a literal claim about Judas's eternal net worth. Suppose it really does mean that Judas's total existence, added up across all of time and eternity, will never produce more good than harm. On the traditional view, that means Judas suffers endlessly. He is conscious, in torment, forever.11
But if one person's existence is an eternal net loss, what does that do to the experience of everyone who ever loved him? Talbott presses this with considerable force. He argues that love binds people together such that their happiness becomes inseparable. As he puts it, "if two persons are bound together in love, their purposes and interests, even the conditions of their happiness, are so logically intertwined as to be inseparable." If Judas's mother is among the redeemed, her knowledge of her son's endless suffering brings a strange tension into the joy of heaven. The bliss of the saints would coexist, for some of its residents, with the knowledge that a loved one is endlessly ruined.12
R. Zachary Manis, a philosopher of religion writing in Sinners in the Presence of a Loving God, takes this argument further. He notes that eternal damnation is "the ultimate horrendous evil" and argues that "the only way for God to meet this requirement [of ensuring each life is a great good overall] is to ensure the salvation of every last person." Manis cites the Judas saying directly as the illustration of what is at stake: a life that is a net loss is a life God's goodness cannot leave unredeemed.12b
Robin Parry, in The Evangelical Universalist, traces this line of argument from Friedrich Schleiermacher in the nineteenth century through Talbott and Eric Reitan in our own day. As Parry observes, "hell thus appears to undermine the glory of heaven." The problem is sharp. The redeemed in heaven will never be perfectly happy so long as someone they love is lost. Yet heaven is, by its nature, a place of perfect happiness. If both claims are true, then none will be finally lost.12c
I am not building the whole case on this point. But I think it shows something important. The saying "better never to have been born" does not uniquely favor the traditional reading. If pressed as a literal, eternal-net-loss claim, it creates problems for every position. The traditionalist who uses it as a proof text must also explain something. How can the saints in heaven be fully blessed while knowing that someone they loved is endlessly lost?13
A Common Objection: "You're Dodging the Plain Meaning"
Someone will say: "The saying means what it says. Judas's existence is a net loss. Stop looking for escape hatches." I hear that. But I am not looking for an escape hatch. I am asking what the saying actually meant in its setting. In the Old Testament, this kind of language always expresses horror over present or near suffering, not a verdict on eternal destiny. If we are going to press it further than the Old Testament parallels take it, we should have a reason, not just an assumption.
Now turn to John 17:12. Jesus calls Judas "the son of destruction" (Greek ho huios tēs apōleias). This sounds final. It sounds like a title of doom.
But the phrase is a Semitic idiom. In Hebrew and Aramaic, "son of" followed by an abstract noun means "a person characterized by that quality." A "son of peace" (Luke 10:6) is a peaceful person. A "son of light" (1 Thessalonians 5:5) is a person who walks in the light. A "son of thunder" (Mark 3:17) is a loud, forceful person. So a "son of destruction" is, in its basic sense, a person marked by destructiveness, by ruin, by waste.14
The question is whether the idiom marks Judas's character and role in the passion, or whether it stamps his eternal fate. I think the evidence points more toward the former. Consider that the same phrase appears in 2 Thessalonians 2:3. Paul uses it there for "the man of lawlessness." In that passage, the figure is characterized by his rebellion and by the ruin that attends his work. The title describes what he is and does. It does not necessarily fix his final state across all eternity.15
We can push this further. Look at how the "son of" idiom works in other biblical examples. "Sons of Belial" in the Old Testament (Judges 19:22, NKJV) means "worthless men." It does not mean "men eternally destined to be worthless." "Sons of the kingdom" in Matthew 8:12 describes people who belong to the kingdom. "Sons of this age" in Luke 16:8 describes people shaped by the present order. In every case, the idiom says something about the person's present character. It does not issue a permanent, irrevocable decree.
There is also the question of the exception clause in John 17:12. Jesus says, "Not one of them has been lost except the son of destruction." What does "except" (Greek ei mē) mean here? Does it mean "this one was lost and stays lost forever"? Or does it mean "this one was the exception during my earthly ministry"?16
The grammar alone does not settle the question. But notice what Jesus is reporting. He says, "While I was with them, I kept them." He is speaking about a specific period: His earthly presence with the disciples. Judas was lost during that time. But Jesus is not making a claim about what happens beyond death. He is not saying anything about the reach of the cross after the resurrection, or about what the Father might yet do with Judas.17
Plain Words
Semitic idiom: a way of speaking common in Hebrew and Aramaic, the languages behind much of the New Testament. "Son of [X]" means "a person characterized by [X]." Apōleia (Greek): destruction, ruin, waste. The word family is studied fully in Chapter 27. Exception clause: the phrase "except the son of destruction" in John 17:12, which uses the Greek ei mē ("if not" or "except").
I want to be careful here. I am not claiming that "son of destruction" is a friendly title. It is not. Judas's role in the betrayal was terrible, and the language reflects that. What I am saying is that the phrase, read as the Semitic idiom it is, describes Judas's character and his function in the passion story. It does not, by itself, seal his eternal fate beyond all possibility of God's further work.18
Here the tension gets sharpest, and I want to state it honestly. In John 6:39, Jesus says, "This is the will of him who sent me, that I should lose nothing of all that he has given me, but raise it up on the last day." In John 17:12, Judas appears to be the one who was lost. How do we hold these together?
The full treatment of the "lose nothing" promise belongs to Chapter 8, and I do not want to repeat that work here. But the short version matters for this chapter. The Father's will is that the Son lose nothing. That will is not a wish that might fail; it is the purpose of the God whose purposes do not return empty (Isaiah 55:11; see Chapter 12).19
If Judas is the permanent exception to that purpose, then the Father's will was, in one case, defeated. And it was defeated not by a cosmic accident, but by the very man whose betrayal was "written" and foreseen. That is a strange position for the traditionalist to hold. The Father willed to lose nothing. Yet one was lost forever. And the loss was part of the plan from the beginning.20
Set Judas's case beside the scope of the cross. Christ died "for the sins of the whole world" (1 John 2:2; see Chapter 11). He is the one who "reconciles all things" to the Father (Colossians 1:20; see Chapter 6). The "all" of Romans 5:18, where condemnation came to all through one man and justification comes to all through one Man, includes Judas. He is part of the "all" the cross reaches.21
I do not think this settles the question by itself. The tension between "lose nothing" and "except the son of destruction" is real, and I will not pretend it is not. What I am saying is that the rest of Scripture's witness puts enormous pressure on the idea that Judas is the one permanent exception to God's saving purpose. The "all" texts do not leave room for permanent exceptions.22
The Tension Stated Honestly
I grant that the Judas texts create a real tension with the "lose nothing" promise of John 6:39 and the "all" of the hope texts. I am not claiming the tension disappears. What I am claiming is that the weight of the whole canon, read together, presses toward the "all" rather than the single exception. The tension is resolved by reading the Judas texts as expressions of the horror of the betrayal, not as the final word on Judas's destiny.
So what do I think Jesus is doing with these words?
I think the woe over Judas is a real and dreadful warning. It expresses the genuine horror of the betrayal and the genuine severity of its consequences. Judas's act was monstrous. He handed over the Son of God for thirty pieces of silver. The suffering that followed was terrible. Matthew 27:3-5 tells us he hanged himself in despair. Jesus spoke the language of woe because woe is what Judas was heading into.
But I do not think Jesus was pronouncing a final, irrevocable sentence on Judas's eternal destiny. The language of "better never to have been born" belongs to the Old Testament tradition of prophetic woe. It expresses the dreadfulness of the situation, not a metaphysical calculation of infinite suffering. And "son of destruction" is a Semitic character-title, not a passport to hell stamped by God.24
Think of it this way. Peter also betrayed Jesus that same night. He denied knowing Him three times, with curses and oaths (Matthew 26:69-75). Peter wept bitterly. And Peter was restored. Jesus sought him out after the resurrection, asked him three times, "Do you love me?" and gave him a commission (John 21:15-17). Peter's betrayal was real. His restoration was also real. The difference between Peter and Judas, in the narrative, is not that one sin was forgivable and the other was not. The difference is that Peter lived to meet the risen Lord, and Judas did not. That is a difference of timing and circumstance, not of the reach of grace.
I want to be clear about what I am not saying. I am not saying Judas's sin was small. I am not saying the consequences were light. I am not saying the woe was mere rhetoric. Every word Jesus spoke was true and weighty. What I am saying is that the words, read in their own idiom and in their literary and historical setting, do not require the conclusion that Judas is suffering endlessly. They are consistent with a terrible judgment that is, in the end, swallowed up by the same grace that swallows up every lesser rebellion.25
I hold this reading with genuine humility. This is one of the hard texts, and I will not claim it is easy. But I believe the weight of the evidence, when we read the idiom, trace the phrase, and set the saying beside the great "all" promises of the rest of Scripture, favors the reading I have given here.
De Young makes the Judas case a centerpiece of his argument. He argues that God "respected" Judas's choice to do evil, and that this same respect must extend to the consequences of that choice. "If God did not intervene to override Judas's will 2000 years ago, why should we think he will do so sometime in the future?"26 He then concludes: "If Judas is one person who will be in hell forever, then the whole structure of universalism falls."27
I appreciate the clarity of the argument. And I agree with De Young on one key point: God does respect human choices. He does not override the will. The universalism this book defends is not one where God drags anyone kicking and screaming into heaven. But I part from De Young on what "respecting the choice" means across all of time and eternity. Respecting a choice does not require fixing it forever. A father respects his son's decision to leave home, but he does not stop wanting him back. He does not lock the door behind him. The door stays open, and the father's love keeps calling.28
George Hurd, in his reply to De Young, presses two points that sharpen the case. First, Hurd reads the saying against its Old Testament background and draws out the Ecclesiastes parallels. Solomon says in Ecclesiastes 4:3 that those who have "never been born" are better off than those who witness the evil done in this world. The reason Solomon gives for this judgment is earthly suffering. He says nothing about the afterlife. Hurd argues that when Jesus uses the same form of speech, He is likewise speaking about the horror of what Judas will face as a result of his betrayal, not making a statement about his eternal post-mortem state.29
Second, Hurd turns the traditional reading back on itself with a sharp observation. On the traditional view of hell, where the majority of humanity faces endless conscious torment, it would have been better for most people never to have been born, not just Judas. If endless suffering makes existence a net loss, then the saying applies to billions. This is not a point the traditionalist usually presses. But it follows from the premise. If "better never to have been born" proves endless ruin for Judas, then the same logic makes the creation itself a mostly failed project. Hurd sees this as a reason to reject the premise rather than the hope.29b
Thomas Talbott presses the logical point I raised above: that a literal, eternal-net-loss reading of the saying creates difficulties not just for universalists but for anyone who believes heaven is a place of genuine joy. If one person's existence is a permanent, infinite loss, and other persons in heaven know this, then heaven contains an unresolved grief that sits strangely with the biblical vision of God wiping away every tear (Revelation 21:4).30
Kirk MacGregor approaches the question from a different angle. Writing within a Molinist framework, he reads Jesus' remark as an instance of metalepsis. That is a recognized first-century Jewish device in which a speaker alludes to an earlier text in a way that evokes the whole setting of that text. MacGregor identifies two texts behind the saying: Jeremiah 20:14–18, where "not born" means dying in the womb, and Job 3:16, where it means being buried as a stillborn. In neither passage does "not born" mean "never existed." MacGregor concludes that Jesus' point is that it would have been better for Judas to have died before birth than to have grown up to betray the Messiah. This is a severe statement, but it is not a verdict on eternity.30b
George Stonehouse, the eighteenth-century scholar of universal restoration, reached the same conclusion. He argued that the saying is proverbial, built from allusions to Jeremiah and Job, and that its plain meaning is that it would have been better for Judas to have died in the womb than to have lived and become the betrayer. "If Judas had died in his mother's womb," Stonehouse wrote, "he still would have been a man ... and at the same time he would not have been the betrayer of his Lord and Redeemer, and so would have escaped the curse which was the horrible issue of his treachery."30c
McClymond does not make the Judas texts a primary focus of his argument in The Devil's Redemption, but his broader claim is worth noting here. He argues that universalism tends to "eclipse" the reality of grace by treating salvation as something owed rather than given. On the Judas question, I would say the opposite is true. It is precisely because I believe in the overflowing, unearned, undeserved grace of God that I hold open the hope that even Judas is not beyond its reach. Grace is what makes this hope possible, and grace is what keeps it humble.31
Matthew Hronich, in Once Loved, Always Loved, raises a point that the standard discussions often overlook. He draws attention to Matthew 19:28, where Jesus promises the original Twelve, "In the Regeneration, when the Son of Man sits upon the throne of his glory, you who have followed me will yourselves sit also upon twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel." Judas was present when Jesus spoke these words. The promise was made to the Twelve, not to the Eleven. Hronich observes that this passage "certainly passes the criteria of dissimilarity" and asks whether Jesus' prophecy will be fulfilled. If someone insists the promise of exaltation is conditional, Hronich asks, then why can Judas's condemnation not also be taken as conditional?31b
This is a small point, but it is a sharp one. The traditional reading tends to assume that Jesus' words of woe fix Judas's fate irrevocably, but it does not apply the same finality to Jesus' words of promise. If one set of words spoken to Judas is taken as permanently binding, the other set should be weighed just as seriously.
I should also note what De Young says about the broader implications of the Judas case. He argues that if God respected Judas's free will during his lifetime, allowing him to make evil choices, then God must continue to "respect" the consequences of those choices forever. He asks: "If God did not intervene to override Judas's will 2000 years ago, why should we think he will do so sometime in the future?" And he concludes: "If Judas is one person who will be in hell forever, then the whole structure of universalism falls."34
This is a fair question. And I want to answer it carefully. I agree that God respects human freedom. I agree that Judas's choice was real and its consequences terrible. But there is a difference between respecting someone's freedom and locking them into the worst moment of their life forever. A judge respects the guilty verdict. But the sentence is not always life without parole. In the biblical vision of judgment, the purpose is not simply to honor the sinner's rebellion. The purpose is to bring the sinner, if possible, through judgment to repentance. That is what the purifying fire of Chapter 17 is about.
This is the strongest form of the traditional argument. If Judas eventually reaches heaven, then his existence is, in the final accounting, a net good. And if his existence is a net good, then it was not "better" that he had never been born. So the saying can only be true if his suffering never ends.
I answer this in two ways. First, the Old Testament parallels show that the idiom does not require a literal, infinite-duration reading. Job said it, and Job was restored. Jeremiah said it, and Jeremiah was not damned. The phrase is the language of woe, not the language of accounting. And as Hurd, MacGregor, and Beauchemin all point out, the saying does not even claim non-existence. It claims it would have been better not to have been born. That is a different claim, and it lines up with the Ecclesiastes parallels where the stillborn child is better off than the one who lives without fulfillment.
Second, even if we press the saying toward a literal reading, the Talbott point holds: the literal reading creates problems for the traditionalist too. If one person's existence is a permanent net loss, what does that say about the creation itself, and about the joy of every person in heaven who knew Judas? Hurd sharpens this further. On the traditional view of hell, where the majority of humanity is endlessly tormented, the "better never to have been born" logic does not single Judas out. It applies to billions. If endless suffering makes existence a net loss, then most of God's creatures should never have existed. The traditionalist rarely says this out loud. But the premise requires it.32
I do not claim this makes the text easy. What I claim is that this is a hard text read by weighing, not a knock-down proof for any single view. The idiom opens a legitimate alternative to the traditional reading, and the alternative fits better with the rest of Scripture's witness.33
What If the Saying Is Not an Idiom?
Some will argue that Jesus was not using an idiom at all, that He was making a unique, literal claim about Judas's fate. I cannot rule that out completely. But I can point to three things. First, the clear Old Testament parallels (Job 3:3; Jeremiah 20:14; Ecclesiastes 4:2–3; 6:3) show that this form of speech existed and Jesus knew it. The burden of proof falls on the one who insists He stepped outside the known idiom to make a one-of-a-kind metaphysical pronouncement. Second, MacGregor's metalepsis argument shows that Jesus' wording echoes these passages in a way that calls up their full context. Third, the text says "not born," not "never existed." That distinction, as Hurd and Beauchemin note, changes the weight of the claim.
De Young argues that the title "son of destruction" in John 17:12 seals Judas's fate. He contends that God respected Judas's choice to betray Christ and will continue to respect the consequences of that choice forever.34
I have already addressed the idiom above. "Son of destruction" is a Semitic characterization. It describes what Judas was during the passion, not necessarily what he will be for all eternity. The same phrase in 2 Thessalonians 2:3 describes the "man of lawlessness." Even there it functions as a character-title for an eschatological figure. It is not used as a settled divine verdict on an individual's eternal post-mortem state.35
De Young also argues more broadly that God's respect for human choices must have "everlasting force." He draws a parallel between divine sovereignty and human freedom: both are permanent, both have eternal consequences. I take this seriously. But I think the parallel breaks down at a key point. God's sovereignty is grounded in His eternal, unchanging nature. Human choices are made in time, from limited knowledge, under the pressure of sin. To treat a choice made in darkness as though it must bind a person for all eternity is to give that choice more weight than it can bear. God can honor the reality of a human choice and still work to bring the person to a better one.34
The fuller question of what the destruction-words (apollumi, olethros, apōleia) actually mean belongs to Chapter 27, and I will not try to settle it here. But I will say this much. The destruction language in the New Testament is not as simple as "gone forever." The word apollumi can mean "ruin" or "lose" as well as "destroy." The lost sheep and the lost coin in Luke 15 are both "destroyed" (apolōlos) in the same sense: lost, but found again.36
The woe over Judas is one of the hardest texts in the New Testament for the larger hope. I have not tried to make it easy. What I have tried to show is that the traditional reading, which builds a case for endless punishment on this saying, asks the words to carry more weight than the Old Testament idiom, the Semitic characterization, and the broader witness of Scripture can bear.
The saying "better never to have been born" is the language of prophetic woe, used across the Old Testament for terrible situations that were not themselves endless. The title "son of destruction" is a Semitic idiom of characterization, not a divine verdict on eternal destiny. And when we set these texts beside the "lose nothing" promise and the great "all" texts of the canon, the weight falls on the side of hope, not on the side of one permanent exception.
The Hope Held with Fear
This chapter does not pretend that Judas's sin was small. It was not. The betrayal of the Son of God is among the most terrible acts in all of history. And this book does not pretend that the warning over Judas is empty rhetoric. It is a real woe, spoken by a truthful Lord, over a real and dreadful act. What the book refuses is the leap from "real judgment" to "endless, purposeless suffering." The hope this book defends is not triumphant or breezy. On a text like this one, the hope is held with fear, with humility, and with the honest admission that the tension is genuine. The God of the cross does not make light of sin. But the God of the cross does not give up on sinners, either (see Chapter 1 and Appendix B).
What gives me hope for Judas is the same thing that gives me hope for everyone else: the character of God and the reach of the cross. If Christ died for the sins of the whole world (1 John 2:2), that includes Judas's sin. If the Father's will is that the Son lose nothing (John 6:39), that will is not defeated by one man's betrayal. If God is bringing all things together in Christ (Ephesians 1:10), "all things" does not have an asterisk beside it.37
The woe over Judas is real. The judgment is real. But the God who speaks the woe is the same God who descended into death, who sought the lost, and who will not rest until every creature joins the praise of Revelation 5:13. That is the hope this book holds. And on a text as hard as this one, it is enough to hold it humbly, honestly, and on the strength of the whole counsel of God (Chapter 30).
↑ 1. The traditional argument is stated clearly by De Young: "Jesus said that, in light of his future, he should never have been born." James B. De Young, Exposing Universalism: Setting the Record Straight (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock / Resource Publications, 2018), ch. 11.
↑ 2. The phrase ho huios tēs apōleias occurs in the New Testament only at John 17:12 and 2 Thessalonians 2:3. On its Semitic background, see the discussion at note 14 below.
↑ 3. The dual structure of divine sovereignty and human accountability in Matthew 26:24 is widely noted by commentators. See R. T. France, The Gospel of Matthew, NICNT (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007), on Matt 26:24. France observes that the saying holds both the divine "as it is written" and the human "woe" in a single breath. The Luke 22:21–22 parallel ("the Son of Man goes as it has been determined, but woe to that man by whom he is betrayed") brings the tension into even sharper focus. On this dual structure, see also Timothy Stratton, Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2022), who cites Plummer's observation that "it is part of the divine decree that the death of the Christ should be accompanied by betrayal ... yet this does not destroy the freedom or responsibility of Judas."
↑ 4. De Young, Exposing Universalism, ch. 11, "The Example of Judas": "His betrayal of Jesus Christ is reckoned in light of both divine sovereignty and planning, and also human accountability."
↑ 5. The Semitic "son of [abstract noun]" construction is a genitival idiom meaning "one characterized by" or "belonging to" the quality named. BDAG (A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature, 3rd ed.) lists huios with a genitive of quality as a Semitism: "son of peace" (Luke 10:6), "sons of light" (1 Thess 5:5), "son of thunder" (Mark 3:17). The idiom does not by itself fix the eternal destiny of the person so described.
↑ 6. The phrase ho huios tēs apōleias in 2 Thessalonians 2:3 describes the eschatological "man of lawlessness." The shared title between Judas and this figure has generated significant scholarly discussion. See Gordon D. Fee, The First and Second Letters to the Thessalonians, NICNT (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009), on 2 Thess 2:3.
↑ 7. Job 3:3 (ESV): "Let the day perish on which I was born, and the night that said, 'A man is conceived.'" Jeremiah 20:14 (ESV): "Cursed be the day on which I was born! Let the day when my mother bore me not be blessed!" Ecclesiastes 4:2–3 (ESV): "And I thought the dead who are already dead more fortunate than the living who are still alive. But better than both is he who has not yet been and has not seen the evil deeds that are done under the sun." These form a cluster of Old Testament "better-not-to-have-been-born" or "cursed-be-the-day" sayings.
↑ 8. The woe-idiom reading is supported by a range of commentators. Craig Blomberg, Matthew, NAC (Nashville: Broadman, 1992), on Matt 26:24, notes that the saying expresses the severity of Judas's coming judgment without necessarily specifying its exact nature or duration.
↑ 8b. George Sidney Hurd, The Triumph of Mercy: The Reconciliation of All through Jesus Christ (2014), "Better for Judas Not to Have Been Born." Hurd draws the distinction between "not born" and "never existed" by way of Ecclesiastes 6:3, where a stillborn child (conceived and existing, but not born into life) is said to be better off than one who lives without fulfillment. He argues that Jesus' saying follows the same logic: it would have been better for Judas to have died before birth than to have lived and betrayed the Son of God. Hurd further notes that Ecclesiastes 4:3 gives the reason for the "better not to have been born" saying as earthly suffering, not eternal post-mortem torment.
↑ 8c. Kirk MacGregor, Molinist Philosophical and Theological Ventures (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2024). MacGregor identifies Jesus' remark as an instance of metalepsis, a recognized first-century Jewish device of alluding to earlier Scripture in a way that evokes the full context of the source text. He identifies two allusions: Jeremiah 20:14–18 (where "better not to have been born" means existing and then dying in the womb) and Job 3:16 (where the same concept is "being buried like a stillborn child"). In both cases, "not born" does not mean non-existence but death before birth. MacGregor concludes: "The point of Jesus' remark to Judas is that it would have been better if Judas had existed and then experienced miscarriage or abortion than if Judas was born and grew up to betray Jesus."
↑ 8d. Gerry Beauchemin, Hope Beyond Hell: The Righteous Purpose of God's Judgment, Q&A #14: "This passage does not say that it would have been better for Judas if his mother had never conceived him, only that he not had been born. There is a big difference." Beauchemin draws the same Ecclesiastes 6:3 parallel as Hurd.
↑ 9. The saying is set within the narrative of the Last Supper, immediately before the betrayal. Its function within the narrative is prophetic warning, not systematic theology. Matthew's placement of the saying between the prediction of betrayal (26:21) and the institution of the Lord's Supper (26:26–29) reinforces its immediate, situational force.
↑ 10. This does not reduce the saying to "mere rhetoric." The woe is genuine, the consequences real. The point is that the genre of prophetic woe does not require a commitment to the infinite duration of the suffering invoked. Job's woe was real; his restoration was also real.
↑ 11. Thomas Talbott raises this argument in The Inescapable Love of God, 2nd ed. (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2014), chs. 4 and 10. Talbott contends that the traditional reading, which treats the saying as a literal statement about Judas's eternal net worth, creates philosophical and theological difficulties for the traditional position as well as for universalism. His broader argument is that God "permits no evil, however horrendous it may appear to us in the present, that he cannot eventually overcome and turn to good; neither does he permit any harm to befall his loved ones that he cannot in the end repair."
↑ 12. Talbott, The Inescapable Love of God, 2nd ed. The argument, in brief, is that "if two persons are bound together in love, their purposes and interests, even the conditions of their happiness, are so logically intertwined as to be inseparable" (cited in R. Zachary Manis, Sinners in the Presence of a Loving God: An Essay on the Problem of Hell [Oxford: Oxford University Press], ch. 3). Talbott initially develops this as an argument against Augustinian views that limit God's love to the elect, then extends it to show that the eternal damnation of any person would undermine the blessedness of all who love that person. See also Jerry L. Walls, Hell: The Logic of Damnation (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), ch. 5, for a non-universalist engagement with this difficulty. Walls is not a universalist; he is cited here as a free-will theist who takes this problem seriously.
↑ 12b. R. Zachary Manis, Sinners in the Presence of a Loving God: An Essay on the Problem of Hell (Oxford: Oxford University Press), ch. 3. Manis draws on Marilyn McCord Adams's principle that God must defeat horrendous evil within the life of each one who participates in it, guaranteeing "a life that is overall 'a great good to him/her on the whole.'" He argues that eternal damnation is "the ultimate horrendous evil" and one that, "nearly by definition, would be undefeated within the life of the person who suffers it." Manis cites the Judas saying (Matt 26:24; Mark 14:21) directly as an illustration of a life rendered "decidedly not a great good to him or her on the whole." Manis is a philosopher of religion working within the analytic tradition; he is cited here as a representative of the philosophical case for universalism.
↑ 12c. Robin A. Parry, The Evangelical Universalist, 3rd ed. (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2024), ch. 1. Parry traces this line of reasoning from Friedrich Schleiermacher through Thomas Talbott and Eric Reitan. He concludes: "all views of hell as eternal conscious torment suffer from two generic problems. First, the punishment seems out of proportion to any crimes humans can commit. ... Second, it is hard to see how God could give the redeemed perfect happiness if some of their loved ones are in hell forever." See also Parry's discussion of Hronich's engagement with William Lane Craig's "memory-wipe" proposal in his own treatment of the problem.
↑ 13. The point is not that the saying disproves the traditional reading. The point is that the saying does not uniquely support it. Every position must deal with the tension the saying introduces, and the universalist has at least as strong a reading as the traditionalist.
↑ 14. For the Semitic "son of" construction with a genitive of quality, see BDAG, s.v. υἱός, §2.c.β; Moisés Silva, ed., New International Dictionary of New Testament Theology and Exegesis (NIDNTTE), 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2014), s.v. υἱός. The construction is pervasive in both Testaments: "sons of Belial" (worthless men, Judg 19:22, NKJV); "sons of the kingdom" (Matt 8:12); "sons of this age" (Luke 16:8). In each case, the "son of" language characterizes the person rather than determining a final cosmic destiny.
↑ 15. Fee, First and Second Thessalonians, on 2 Thess 2:3. Whether the "man of lawlessness" is an individual or a type, the "son of destruction" title in that context functions as a character-description of one whose activity brings ruin. It is not used there as a statement about the individual's eternal post-mortem state.
↑ 16. The ei mē construction in John 17:12 can function as a true exception ("none was lost except this one") or as an idiomatic contrast ("none was lost, but the son of destruction [was lost / fulfilled Scripture]"). Grammarians differ. See Daniel B. Wallace, Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1996), 671–72, on the uses of ei mē and ean mē.
↑ 17. The temporal qualifier "while I was with them" (hote ēmēn met' autōn) limits the scope of Jesus' report to His earthly ministry. Whether Judas remains "lost" beyond that period is a question the text leaves open. See D. A. Carson, The Gospel according to John, PNTC (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991), on John 17:12.
↑ 18. For the broader treatment of the apollumi / apōleia / olethros word family and the question of whether "destruction" in the New Testament necessarily means final, irreversible annihilation or endless conscious suffering, see Chapter 27.
↑ 19. The Father's will that the Son "lose nothing" (John 6:39) is set within the context of God's sovereign purpose. On the relationship between God's will and its accomplishment, see Chapter 12. Isaiah 55:11 (ESV): "So shall my word be that goes out from my mouth; it shall not return to me empty, but it shall accomplish that which I purpose."
↑ 20. The tension is heightened by the fact that the betrayal itself was "as it is written" (Matt 26:24). If the betrayal was foreseen and included in the plan, and if the Father's will is to lose nothing, then the permanent loss of Judas would mean a divine purpose that includes its own defeat. This is a logical difficulty, not a proof, but it should give the traditionalist pause.
↑ 21. See Chapter 4 (Romans 5:18: "as one trespass led to condemnation for all men, so one act of righteousness leads to justification and life for all men"); Chapter 6 (Colossians 1:20: "through him to reconcile to himself all things"); Chapter 11 (1 John 2:2: "the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only but also for the sins of the whole world").
↑ 22. The "all" texts are treated at length in Part One, especially Chapters 4, 5, 6, 9, and 10. The cumulative case is summarized in Chapter 30.
↑ 23. Matthew 27:3–5 records Judas's remorse and suicide. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics 2.2: The Doctrine of God (Edinburgh: T&T Clark), 466, cited in Matthew Hronich, Once Loved, Always Loved: The Logic of Apokatastasis (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2023). The word Matthew uses, metamelomai ("to feel regret"), is not the more common metanoeō ("to turn, change one's mind in the fuller sense"). The distinction is real but should not be pressed too far. What is clear is that Judas was devastated by what he had done.
↑ 23b. Dale C. Allison Jr. and W. D. Davies, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Gospel according to Saint Matthew, ICC, vol. 3 (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1997), 561–62. Allison and Davies argue that metamelētheis may indicate genuine repentance due to its positive usage elsewhere in Matthew's Gospel (21:29, 32). They further note (564) that "Judas separates himself from the money of betrayal and then, as proof of his overwhelming remorse, hangs himself." Cited in Hronich, Once Loved, Always Loved.
↑ 23c. Hronich, Once Loved, Always Loved, citing F. W. Farrar, Mercy and Judgment (London: Macmillan, 1881), 459. Hronich notes that this rendering is likewise supported by the Wycliffe Translation, Young's Literal Translation, the Douay-Rheims Version, and the American Standard Version (1901), among others. On this reading, Jesus is expressing the weight of His own coming suffering, not pronouncing on Judas's eternal destiny.
↑ 23d. Luke 22:22 (ESV): "For the Son of Man goes as it has been determined, but woe to that man by whom he is betrayed!" As Hronich observes, the "better never to have been born" phrase does not appear in Luke's version of the Last Supper scene. The woe stands, but the specific saying that carries the weight of the traditional argument is absent.
↑ 24. For the Old Testament woe-idiom parallels, see notes 7–8 above. For the Semitic "son of" characterization, see notes 5, 14–15. The combined force of the two readings makes the case that neither the saying nor the title requires the conclusion of endless punishment.
↑ 25. On the possibility that judgment, even severe judgment, serves a restorative purpose within the biblical framework, see Chapter 17 (the purifying fire) and Chapter 19 (corrective vs. retributive punishment, kolasis vs. timōria).
↑ 26. De Young, Exposing Universalism, ch. 11: "If God respected or allowed Judas' choice then to do such evil, why should we think that God will not respect the results of that choice? ... If God did not intervene to override Judas's will 2000 years ago, why should we think he will do so sometime in the future?"
↑ 27. De Young, Exposing Universalism, ch. 11: "But if Judas is one person who will be in hell forever, then the whole structure of universalism falls, since it claims that all in hell must come out of it because of God's love."
↑ 28. The parable of the prodigal son (Luke 15:11–32) is the biblical illustration nearest to hand. The father respected the son's departure, but the father's respect did not become indifference. He watched for the son's return. On the role of divine seeking and persuasion without coercion, see Chapter 8 and Chapter 29.
↑ 29. George Sidney Hurd, The Triumph of Mercy: The Reconciliation of All through Jesus Christ (2014), "Better for Judas Not to Have Been Born." Hurd reads the Ecclesiastes parallels (Eccl 4:3; 6:3) alongside Jesus' saying and argues that the reason given in the Old Testament for "better not to have been born" is the evil one faces in this life on earth, not eternal post-mortem suffering. He writes: "The reason Solomon gives as to why it would be better not to be born is because of the evil one faces in this life on earth. He says nothing concerning the afterlife in this regard." See also Hurd, A Defense of Biblical Universalism: A Biblical Response to James B. De Young's "Exposing Universalism" (2019), which engages De Young's Judas argument at chapter level.
↑ 29b. Hurd, The Triumph of Mercy, "Better for Judas Not to Have Been Born": "According to the traditional view of eternal punishment for the vast majority, it would have been better for almost all rational beings to have never existed and not just Judas, since according to them the majority will be tormented throughout all eternity." The point is significant. If the "better never to have been born" logic proves endless ruin, it proves it for billions, not just for one man. The traditionalist must either accept this consequence or abandon the premise.
↑ 30. Talbott, The Inescapable Love of God, 2nd ed. (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2014), chs. 4 and 10. Talbott argues that the blessedness of the redeemed is theologically strained if it coexists with the knowledge that some whom they loved are suffering endlessly. The claim of eternal net loss creates an unresolved grief in heaven that the biblical vision of God wiping away every tear (Rev 21:4) does not allow. Hronich develops the point further in Once Loved, Always Loved, engaging William Lane Craig's proposal that God might "obliterate" the saints' memories of the damned. As Hronich argues, if the correspondence theory of truth holds, then such obliteration involves God in either deception or the destruction of the saints' personal identity, since a person's memories are constitutive of who they are. See also Parry, The Evangelical Universalist, 3rd ed., ch. 1, who traces the argument from Schleiermacher through Talbott and Eric Reitan. Cited at book and chapter level.
↑ 30b. MacGregor, Molinist Philosophical and Theological Ventures, ch. 5. MacGregor places the saying within the recognized rhetorical device of metalepsis, in which a speaker alludes to an Old Testament text in a way that evokes its larger context. He identifies the allusions to Jeremiah 20:14–18 and Job 3:16, in both of which the "better not to have been born" language refers to death before birth, not to non-existence. This is a careful linguistic argument from a philosopher of religion working within the Molinist tradition.
↑ 30c. George Stonehouse, cited in Robin A. Parry, ed., A Larger Hope? Volume 2: Universal Salvation from the Reformation to the Nineteenth Century (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2019), 359–61, 396–97. Stonehouse argued that the saying is proverbial, with allusions to Jeremiah 20:11–18 and Job 3:2–9, and that it means: "It had been better for that man that he had died in his mother's womb; that he had proved an abortive birth; that he had been carried from the womb to the grave." His reasoning: if Judas had died before birth, he would still have existed as a person, but he would not have become the betrayer.
↑ 31. Michael J. McClymond, The Devil's Redemption: A New History and Interpretation of Christian Universalism, 2 vols. (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2018). McClymond's "eclipse of grace" thesis (§12.3) argues that universalism tends to replace grace with nature or necessity. The Judas case, on the reading this book defends, is answered precisely by grace: Judas's hope, if there is one, rests entirely on the unearned grace of God in Christ, not on any right or inevitability.
↑ 31b. Matthew Hronich, Once Loved, Always Loved: The Logic of Apokatastasis (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2023). Hronich observes that in Matthew 19:28, Jesus promises the original Twelve (Judas among them) that they will "sit upon twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel." This promise was spoken in Judas's hearing and has not been formally revoked in the text. Hronich argues: "if Judas' exaltation might be understood as conditional, then why can't his condemnation similarly be taken as such?" He further notes the parallel to Narnia's Edmund: "I have every confidence that I will one day shake [h]ands with the quintessential Edmund, whom the real Aslan gave His life for." The reference to the twelve thrones does not settle the question, but it creates a real tension for the reader who insists that Judas's condemnation is irrevocable while treating his promised exaltation as void. See also David Bentley Hart, The New Testament: A Translation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017), 39.
↑ 32. The point can be framed as a dilemma. If "better never to have been born" is a literal, metaphysical claim, it implies that God created a being whose existence He knew would be a permanent, infinite loss. That raises serious questions about divine goodness and wisdom that the traditionalist must answer. Hurd sharpens this: on the traditional view of endless punishment for the majority, the "better never to have been born" logic applies to billions, not just to Judas (The Triumph of Mercy, "Better for Judas Not to Have Been Born"). If the saying is an idiom of woe, the difficulty dissolves for all positions alike. And if the distinction between "not born" and "never existed" holds (Hurd, MacGregor, Beauchemin), even a non-idiomatic reading does not require the conclusion of permanent, infinite loss. The idiom reading is therefore the more parsimonious.
↑ 33. On the method of reading hard texts in light of the whole counsel of Scripture, see Chapter 3.
↑ 34. De Young, Exposing Universalism, ch. 11. De Young's broader argument is that God's respect for human freedom has "everlasting force" and that universalism "destroys human responsibility for people to choose as they wish." The free-will question is engaged more fully in Chapter 29.
↑ 35. See notes 6, 14–15 above. The destruction-word study is taken up fully in Chapter 27.
↑ 36. In Luke 15, the lost sheep (to apolōlos, v. 4), the lost coin (apolesan, v. 8), and the lost son (apolōs, v. 24) all use forms of apollumi. In each case, the "lost" or "destroyed" thing is found and restored. The verb does not by itself determine whether the loss is permanent. See Chapter 27 for the full word study.
↑ 37. Ephesians 1:10 (ESV): "as a plan for the fullness of time, to unite all things in him, things in heaven and things on earth." On the scope of this "all things," see Chapter 6.